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The Critique of Abstract
Individualism
(June 197h)

JohnW. Buell, B.A., Amherst College
M.A., Columbia University

Directed by: Professor William E. Connolly

The author examines two contrasting
conceptions of hujnan naturethe abstract individualist and social
conceptions.

assumes

tliat

The first

human beings are born with a set of basic
desires

which determine the most important aspects
of behavior.

These

desires do not vary idth the society and society
can only channel
or limit these.

The social conception assumes that language and

vsocial institutions constitute in large
measure an individual's

identity and that the needs of the individual vary

id.th the society.

The author examines some philosophical aspects and
implications
of these views.

He then shows that different views of human nature

are closely connected to particular approaches to the
society.

stud;>-

of

Lastly, he shows that different philosophies of moral

discourse as well as different understandings of contemporary

political issues are connected to differences in the view of
human nature one holds.

INTRODUCTION
Many modern political scientists
are fond of sayin
s
that their discipline has .noved
beyond philosophical
speculation about such questions as
human nature.
The

task of political science is to
establish laws of political and social chanfje, and in this
process empirical
research rather than speculation is
necessary J Indeed,
whatever worth the great classics of
political theory
have lies in some of the testable
empirical propositions
which can be culled from them, such as
Aristotle's

discussion of the causes of tyranny, rather
than in
airy speculation on such topics as human
nature.

Yet in the history of political thought views
of

human nature seem to have been rather closely
connected
with the way in v/hich theorists study human institutions
and action.

And the ways in which theorists study man

also seem to have pushed their conceptions of human

nature in particular directions.
that

mail

Thus Hobbes's belief

and society can be studied as we study a watch

seemed to reinforce and be reinforced by his conception
of human nature as a complex mechanism.

Ihough the

connection here does not seem to be a matter of logical
entailment, each assumption puts pressure on the other.
^Sco for ijir.tance the introduction by Harry Eckstein
to Eckstein ajid David Apter, eds
Comparative Politics
(New York:
Free Press, I963).
.

,

.

The possibility of this connection
first became
apparent to me in studying Hobbes, and
I became curious
as to whether it was an accident
of Hobbes -s work or
something which could be seen in the work
of other
political thinkers. I will argue in this
thesis that
a view of human nature which may
be characterized as

abstract individualist^ pervades much of
mainstream
political science and that this view is
connected to
a particular method of study popular in
contemporary

social science.
The abstract individualist conception of human

nature suggests that man comes into the world with
a
set of given or innate wants, needs, and purposes.

These basic drives in man are abstracted from any

particular society, and they determine the most
important aspects of man's action in society.

Society

is basically a collection of these independent beings.
It can restrain and channel their impulses, but these

drives exist with or without society and cannot be

basically altei-ed by it.
This philosophical anthropology implies a number

of other important ideas.

It suggests that human reason

2

Steven Lukes discusses many ramifications of the
concept individualism, including': the concept abstract
individualism in his Individualism (New York: Oxlord
University Press, 1973).
,

merely channels or

lincis

outlets for the given human

passions.

The reasons people give for actions
and the
concepts developed in social life are not
basic to human
action. They come after the fact. This
conception
of

human nature is also dot orministic— man is a
being who
is driven by his innate passions and his
actions
are

regarded as the inevitable result of the passions
and
their opportunity for gratification.
The first chapter of this thesis, then, will be

devoted to spelling out the contours of this conception
of man through an examination of its first great spokesman, Hobbes.

Then the connection of this view to ways

in which man is studied will also be considered.
In the next chapter I will argue that a remarkably

similar view of man pervades the work of mainstream

political science.

My principal example here will be

Robert Dahl, especially his work on the nature of

political inquiry and on American democracy.

liith

Dahl, as with Hobbes, the view of man bears a close

connection to the methods of study adopted by the social
scientist and the ways in which societies are evaluated.
The belief in basic passions underlying our most im-

portant actions with the accompanying view of human

reason and determinism imply that the proper study
of man must bo the search for laws which govern man's

behavior.

Furthermore, it is believed that in the

quest for such laws the moral values of tho
investifrat or
can and must be kept separate from his
scientific investitTatioDs

.

Political scientists are not to be faulted
because
one can discover in their work such a
connection between
an implicit view of human nature and methods
of study.

The problem lies rather in the fact that the
connection
is unrecofjnized and the view of human nature
unexamined

and inadequately supported.

If a view of man and an

approach to science each reinforce the other, it is not
adequate to claim that views of man are unimportant or

"supported by evidence", for the method of study is not

ngutra l with ros[?ect to the answers to the cmcstion on
this point

.

Because of this fact it is important to

look at a significant and historically influential

critique of the Ilobbesian position, that provided by

Rousseau.

In chapter three I will spell out the social

view of man espoused by Rousseau and the ways in which
it systematically rejects the central assumptions of

Ilobbesian individualism.

As is the case with the atoniistic conception of man,

Rousseau's view carries with it implications for the
study and evaluation of society.

In particular it

leads us to question the search for causal law-like
re{?ularities in human behavior and to reconsider the

connection between explanation and normative
discourse
in social science. The fourth chapter
will
explore

these issues through an examination of
Peter Winch's
The Idea of a Social Science in which a
social conception

of man is developed, a conception with
which a far
different approach to the study of man is
connected.
This approach explains an individual's action

at least

in part in terms of his reasons and denies
that behavior
is determined in the natural scientist's causal
sense.

And it assumes that the study of a society must
begin
from an understanding of the concepts and beliefs a--ailablc to the participants.

The moral implications of a social conception of

man will be examined in the fifth chapter.

There I will

argue that Vinch has pushed a social conception of man
in directions Rousseau would never have found comfortable.

Rousseau maintains that human beings are social creatures
constituted in part by the language and institutions of
their society and, yet, also argues that some societies
are better than others.

I

will advance some arguments

in support of this apparently paradoxical position.

My purpose in spelling out these competing conceptions of human nature are threefold.
I hope to show,

first, that a connection between

the methods of study and assumptions about man does

exist and thus that questions
about human nature may not
be brushed aside or merely treated
"empirically", for
What wc rocard as empirical treatment
depends in part on
and helps sustain our view of man.
There is a need for
social scientists to become more
self-conscious about
the view of human nature they hold
and its ties to many
aspects of their work,

A second purpose I have involves advocacy
of a
particular perspective. I regard a social
conception
of human nature as superior to the theories
of abstract
individualism prevalent in mainstream political

science.

In the course of delineating the social view
of man I

will advance some philosophical arguments which
support
this position and its implications.
Finally, this thesis is not intended to be merely
an academic discussion which will make social
scientists

more solf-aware.

We all hold theories of human nature,

at least implicitly,

and policy differences often turn

on and sometimes can be better understood in terms of
the competinf? conceptions of human nature.

In the

last chapter I will examine some public policy works

critical of certain aspects of American politics.

T}iese

works differ si^vnif leant ly in outlook and proposals, and
I v;ill show that they can be better understood and judged

when we consider the images of man to which they are

Indebted.

In fact serious consideration of
a radical

notion or community, advocated by many
today, is Tacil
itated by recc'.nizin,? tbat this idoal
is indebted to a
defensible conception of human nature quite
different
from that which prevails in our society
and our
social

science literature.

I

c n A p T E n

I

IIOBBES^ AND ABSTRACT
INDIVIDUALISM

Hobbes's Contract Theory and The
State of Nature
In order to understnad the
abstract individualist

conception of human nature and its
role in contemporary
political science, a useful place in
which to begin is
Thomas llobbes's Leviathan. Hobbes
of course does not

present the only possible version of
abstract individualism, but its central assumptions
are clear in his
Avork,

and his influence has been great even
on those

who do not accept the political conclusions
of his theory,
Hobbes expresses his conception of human
nature in
the course of his discussion of the state
of nature.

That conception underlies his view of social
interaction
once human beings leave the state of nature and
enter
the civil social state.
In the state of nature human bein^;s are actuated

by two basic passions:

they seek endlessly after all

^This analysis of Hobbes is indebted to several
studies. The most useful to me have been John Plamenatz,
Society Vol. I, (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co.,
Miin
1963) and Sheldon Wolin, Politics and Vision
(Boston:
Little Brown and Co., I96O) and Norman Jacobson, "Thomas
Hobbos ns Creator," (New York: General Learning Pi-oss,
1971).
.

.

things which brine them pleasure and they
try to avoid
violent death. Hobbes believes that these
basic given
facts of human existence are reflected in
our vocabulary
of good and evil.
"Good" to Hobbes means no more
than

that to which an individual aspires:
But whatsoever is the object of any man's
appetite or desire, that is it which he
for his part calls good. , . For these
words of good, evil, and contenptiblo are
ever used with relation to the person
that uses them, there being nothing simply
and absolutely so, nor any common rule of
good and evil to be taken from the nature
of the objects themselves.

People in the state of nature are all relatively
equal, and so the condition which results from the pres-

ence of the basic instincts is a war of all against all.

Every man seeks power in order to gain security for his
possessions.

The quest for power is not itself basic

but derives from fear in a world where all men are seek-

ing goods and all are relatively equal.

for power brings security for few.

Yet this quest

The equality of all

and their endless search for pov/er insures that life in
the state of nature will be a continuous war of all

against all.

In a condition where each man must provide

his own security,

".

.

.there is no place for industry

because the fruit thereof is uncertain; and consequently
2

Thomas Hobbes, I.eviathan cd, by Herbert \v, Sclmeider,
(Indianapolis: Bobbs-i\errill Co., I958), p. 33,
,

no culture of the earth; no navigation, nor
use of the

commodities that may be imported by sea

.

.

.,

no knew-

ledee of the face of the earth; no account of time;
no
arts; no letters; no society; and which is worst of
all,

continual fear and dan/rer of violent death; and the life
of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.

This state of war would not end except for the fact
that people are also capable of reason.

reason Hobbes means that human

bein,<;s

By the concept

are able to use

their minds in order to figure out prudential courses
of action which will better insure the secure attainment

of their basic desires.

The role of reason as a puide

to the fulfillment of our passions is already implied

in the discussion of good and evil.

It is made explicit

in the analysis ©f how men come to leave the state of

nature.

There we are told that a law of nature is a

general rule "found out by reason, by which a man is

forbidden to do
and to

onjit

preserved

tliat

which is destructive of his life

that by which he thinketh it may be best

.

The outcome of reason's quest for the secure sat-

-^Ibid.,

p.

107.

Ibid .

p.

109

.

.

.
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Isf action of man's passions is the social
contract. This
contract is an afrreemont among all equal
citizens that
each will obey a coimuon sovcreicn on tho
condition that
his fellow citizens will likewise do so.
The contract is
not between citizens and the sovereign but
merely
an

agreement among all citizens to give up the power
to
pursue all objects of desire at will. it is the

outcome

of prudential reasoning of beings motivated by
their

individual ambitions.
Once the sovereign state is established the citizen
is under an obligation to obey the sovereign as long as

that sovereign provides order.

When it no longer does

so it in effect ceases to be a sovereign,

Hobbes does not believe that people will be basically
changed ©ither by the process of making the contract or
by entering civil society.

They will continue to pursue

their own individual desires within the limits enforced

by the state, and the state's ultimate weapon, the use
of force, is necessary to insure that each person's

egoistic passions will not go so far as to destroy the
social order.

The preservation of order remains so

problematic that Hobbes feels it necessary to sug^rest
maxims to guide the sovereign in the preservation of
order.

And even v/ithin society Hobbes expects that the

fear of death will remain so strong that persons charged

with capital crimes vlll
resist attempts by the state
to aei.e the,„ and he
regards such resistance as
leciti„,at,
because the Tear of violent
death led to the contract
in

the first place.

Elements in Abstr^ict Individual!
sm
In Hobbes's social contract
theory we can find the

principal elements which constitute
the abstract individualist or atomistic conception of
human nature.
Before going on to discuss some of
the consequences of
this conception of man, it would be
useful to

summarize

In a fjeneral way the basic elements of
this view.
In the first place this conception
regards each

person born into the world as the locus of a
given set
•f fixed passions. The nature of the social
ties or

the language community into which one is born
does not

affect this essentially given human nature.

Theorists

of the abstract individual may disagree amongst themselves as to the exact contours of these passions.

It

is the shared assumption of a set of fixed passions

which unites them.

Many theorists disagree with Hobbes

in attributing to people a set of exclusively solf-

rogarding instincts.

Some attribute to man more benev-

olent instincts and so are not as pessimistic in the

political conclusions they derive from their conception

ef human nature.

The important point is. however,
that

the instincts are civen and are
regarded as invariant in

their essential contours.

In liobbes both before and
after

the creation of civil society people
want food, sex, and

property.

Society merely limits the ways in which
these
can be attained, but it does not change
the basic objects
of desire.
Secondly, a major consequence of this
understanding
of the passions is the implication that human
action is

determined by the given passions.

Obtaining certain

kinds of goods or performing certain types of behavior

produces pleasure, and human beings will inevitably
act in terms of these given drives.

In addition to

asserting the presence of these basic passions the psychol
ogy is deterministic.

Hobbes's determinism is reflected

in his famous comment on the will:

"In deliberation,

the last appetite or aversion immediately adhering to the

action or the omission tliereof is what we call the will...
Thirdly, the psychology is deterministic not merely

because of its view of the passions but also because it
regards human reason as a distinct and subordinate capaThe task of reason is to channel the passions in

city.

such

way that satisfactory outlets for them are found.

a
5 Op

.

ci t

.

,

Ilobbes,

Leviathan

,

p.

59.

7

Reason is merely instrumental.

It is not something which

partially creates or evaluates and reconstructs
our given
feelln^rs.
Hobbes remarks:
"For the thou£^hts are to the
desires as scouts and spies, to
way to the things desired.

.

ran^-e

abroad and find the

*

."^

Hobbes view of reason is reflected in his definitions
of "emotion" concepts.

He does not view these concepts

as essentially constituted or affected by the social and

linguistic context in which they develop.

Keasen does

not enter into our emotions, nor does it subtly differ-

entiate those conditions which make a particular feeling
like resentment, love, ci'atitude appropriate.

The concepts

refer rather to certain gut feelings present in all
cultures, feelings which are manifested in similar be-

havioral acts.

For example, in defining the concept

love, Hobbes declares that "desire and love are the

same thing, save that by desire we always signify the

absence of the object, by love most commonly the presence
of the same." 7

Critics of Hobbes might wish to respond

that love is distinguished from desire by certain ideas

built up within a cultural context about the appropriateness
^

Ibid

. ,

'^Ibid.

.

p.

68.

p.

52,

and characteristics of the "desired
object." Love as we
know it would not exist apart Iron,
those ideas we have
built up about it.
It thus cannot be reduced to
a univeral.eut feelin,-, something which becomes
more clear
when v.e think about some of the different
conceptions
of love which heave been built up in various
cultures,
such as romantic and courtly love.
Lastly, an important aspect of the doctrine
of

abstract individualism is that
object for others.

e^icn

person is merely ah

Your actions may aid, impede or be

indifferent to my quest to fulfill my individualistic
passions and

I

will evaluate you accordingly.

Relation-

ships are not valuable in and of themselves but only for
the private satisfactions to which they lead.

Both in

and out of society human interaction remains external
and manipulative.

Uhen men meet in society:

.if they meet for traffic, it is plain
•
.
every man regards not his fellow, but his
business; if to discliarge some office, a
certain market friendship is begotten, which
InUi more of jealousy in it than true love,
and whence factions may sometimes arise, but
goodwill never; if for pleasure, and recreation of mind, every man is wont to please
himself most with those things which stir
up laughter by comparison of the other man's
defects and infirmities.
And these are
indeed the true delights of society, unto
which we are carried by nature, that is, by
those passions which are incident to all
creatures. All society tliereloro is either
for gain, or j'or glory; tliat is, not so much
,

.

for love of our fellows, as for
the love
or ourselves.

Examination reveals that these four
aspects of the
doctrine of abstract individualism
are closely related
thouf^h the ties are not of the
strict lofrical sort.

When

the passions are regarded as basic
regardless of the
social structure it becomes more easy to
consider human

behavior determined, though it should be
pointed out that
one can be a determinist and reject every
other aspect
of Hobbesian psychology.

When passions are seen as given

entities which control behavior reason will
easily be
treated as instrumental. And conversely, to regard
reason
as instrumental makes it easier to be a
determinist— the

given instincts will not be reconstitued through rational

interaction within society.

Finally all of these views

are nicely congruent with a perspective which denies

any intrinsic importance to social ties.
The above tenets constitiite what
pure type of abstract individualism.

will call the

I
I

believe that in

most respects liobbes is an excellent example of a theorist
of this type, but other great thinkers reflect in muted

form some aspects of this doctrine.
The exact nature and significance of this doctrine
8

Quoted in Norman Jacobson, Op

.

cit

.

p.

k.

will become more clear when
it is contrasted with
the
social view of .„an developed
in chapter three.
I now
want to Show that this
conception of man is an important

doctrine because it is tied to a
whole set of ways in
Which we study and evaluate the
social world. I will do
this by pointing out some of the
ways in which Ilobbes's
conception of social science is
congenial to his theory
of human nature.
I will then ar^o that some
mainstream
political scientists hold an abstract
individualist
conception of

.nan

similar to Hobbesreciprocal:

as well as a view of social
science
s.

In both cases the connections are

A view of science makes a particular
con-

ception of human nature seem more plausible
and that
view of human nature lends support to the
favored conception of science. These connections are not
accidental
and will be found to hold for the social view
of human
nature as well. In fact it seems hard to believe
that

the question of how to study man can really be
detached

from philosophical questions about the basic nature of
the bein^; to be studied.

Hobbes and Science
To understand Hobbes

's

approach to the study of man

it is useful to put him in the context of his period.

was an older contemporary of Newton, and like Kewton he

He

11

felt a great respect for the
work of Galileo. He saw
his
tasic as the creation
of a science of politics
and human
behavior, and he believed that
all the work which preceded
his was idle and danf^erous
speculation.

Science to Hobbes included two
basic and related
concerns.
First was the need to be,;in with
precise definitions, for words derive their
meaning from the things
to Which they refer.
If the reference is not precise
the
words are raeanincjless
Often words with imprecise references become mere repositories for
emotional reactions:
they certainly are not useful for
scientific purposes
and their use constitutes a threat to
social order.
.

Hobbes

view on defintion becomes clear in some
of the
key concepts discussed in the Leviathan
.
's

Thus power is defined as the present means
of an
agent toward the fulfillment of some future
apparent

good.^

Power is one's ability to get that which he wants
and is
therefore observable in the real world. It is

significant

that this view of power lumps together all those
means
^^^hioh

contribute to the realization of one's wants.

reputation for prudence and the implements of war

A
are

both considered forms of power and no moral distinction
is made between them.""^
9
•'•^

QP»

cit

Ibid.

.

.

p.

This fully accords with Hobbes 's

Hobbes, Lcviatlian
79

.

p.

78.

12

requirement that the definition be
"scientific."
addition the definition assumes there
is no distinction
between our stated preferences and our
real

m

interests.

One

has power as lone as he can brin^
about what he wants.
Our
articulated preferences grow out of our
primordial wants.
Hobbes assun,e3 we cannot develop preferences
which do not
correspond to our real needs. The given
wants flow smoothly
into preferences and determine our actions.
Hobbes
's

definition of the concept power fits both his
conception
of man and of science.
Secondly, once the relevant terms have been
precisely
defined, the problem or entity to be studied must
be

broken down into its component parts.

Hobbes believed that

such complex entities as a watch, a man, or a society
are

composed of simple and isolable elements.

Eventually the

researcher can demarcate and isolate for analysis the
simple building blocks of the unit to be studied.

Hobbes

remarks

For as in a watch, or some small enf;:ine, the
matter, figure, and motion of the wheels cannot well be kno^m, except it be taken in sunder,
and viewed in parts; so to make a more curious
search into the rights oi' states, and duties
of subjects, it is necessary (l say not to take
them in sunder, but yet that they be, so considered, as if they were dissolved.)
The purpose of this enterprise is not merely des''^Quoted in Sheldon wolin.

Op.

cit

,

p.

2^7,

criptive.

One searches for irreducible
elements to find
causes. All chan^^es in nature,
man and society have
causes, the necessary and
sufficient conditions for
their
occurrence. These causes can be
located
the changes
and motions of the basic
building blocks.

m

Through the

isolation and observation of these
building blocks one
can establish causal laws.
In other words, one will
then be in a position to know
what events lead to

other
events and thus one can predict
future events. These
basic aspects of the Hobbesian
conception of science
are brought out in his discussion
of the concepts of
reason, meniory, and science:
•

•^G^son is not, as sense and memory,

With us nor gotten by experience only, as born
prudence is, but attained by industry: first
in apt iraposinr: of names, and secondly
in
getting a good and orderly method in proceeding from the elements, which are names,
to assertions made by connection of one of
them to another, and so to syllogisms, which
are the connection of one assertion to another, till we come to a knowledge of all
the consequences of names appertaining to
•

the subject in hand; and that is it men
call science. .\nd whereas sense and memory
are but knowledge of fact, which is a thing
past and irrevocable, science is the knowledge of consequences and dependence of one
fact upon another, by which out of that we
can presently do v/e know hov^^ to do something else v/hen we will, or the like another
time; because when we see how anything comes
about, upon what causes and by what manner,
when the like causes come into our power we
see how to make it possible to produce the
like effocts.^^

^^P

»

cit

,

Ilobbes,

Leviathan

,

p.

^9.

Ik

This view of science is nicely
compatible with the
view of human nature sketched above.
The belief that
every person is the locus of a set
of p;iven
passions,

passions which exist ref.:ardless of the
social matrix,
suggests a mode of analysis which
identifies these basic
building blocks and employs them to
explain behavior, A vi ew
of science which is convinced
that all reality consists of
isolable, irreducible building blocks
will, in turn, tend
to reduce the human personality to
a set of discrete parts
where one part moves the other in mechanistic
fashion
and

where the basic character of each is
independent of the
others and of any possible interation with them.
The quest for laws of behavior both encourages
and
is encouraged by a belief that the given
passions determine

our observed action.

The faith that human behavior is

similar to the movements of natural bodies and thus
predictable justifies a belief in a determining agency and vice

versa.
Thus, in llobbes the conception of human nature and
the notion of science are closely related.

The way in

which Hobbes tries to examine human behavior is not neutral
with respect to the view of the person he holds; it both
assumes and pushes him in the direction of

view of human nature.

a

particular

And that connection leads one to

suspect that the metliod he aday^ts is less conducive to a
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neutral test of the theory he
espouses and more to an
imposition of that theory on "materials"
which may or may
not themselves fit these expectations.

Moral Philosophy and Human Nature
The Hobbesian conception of man and
science is also
related to the stance one takes toward
the evaluation of
societies. The basic Hobbesian position
is that questions
of the morality of a given social order
are irrelevant.

This position has two related roots.

In the first place

he believes that order is a precarious
achievement— to

promote that is enough without worrying about higher
values.

Order is both very necessary and very difficult

given the nature of man.

People must be constantly re-

minded how close the human species is to disorder and
what the price to be paid for disorder is.
Secondly, such moral words as good and justice do
not constitute standards by which societies can be judged.
As we have noted, Hobbes asserts that the only meaning of

good is that to which a man aspires.
to which they aspire.

can bo called good.

Men call good that

Nothing in things or reality itself
Along a similar line, justice is

defined in terms of the commands of the state.
the state commands is ipso Incto just.

Anything

Of course citizens

will often clain) an independent meaning for those terms,
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but they are, according to llobbes,
speaking nonsense and
openincr up the door to future disorder.
There is thus no

meaningful standard by which the practices
of any functioning political order may be judged except
one:

promote order?

Does it

The task with which the social scientist

is left is to spell out in scientific
or law-like terms

those conditions which preserve order.
What we have sketched in this discussion of
Hobbes

and abstract individualism is really a coherent
ideology.

A view of man is related to
moral judgment.

a

conception of science and

If human beings are a-social creatures

of passion, rational moral standards become inappropriate

and one merely seeks scientific laws which spell out the

conditions of a minimal order.

Avoiding talk of moral

standards clears the way for such scientific investigation.

A natural science conception of man pushes us

toward a deterministic psychology and the denial of any

independent role for moral reasoning.
That there is a similar set of related philosophical

assumptions in mainstream political science will be the
theme of the next chapter.

Establishment of this theme

is made more difficult by the fact that contemporary

political scientists generally want to deny that they

proceed from any "untested" assumptions about man.

Yet

as with Hobbes one can sec assumptions about man operating

17

in the ways they seek to explain
human behavior as well
as in other general comments on
the political scene.
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A P T E R

II

ABSTRACT INDIVIDUALISM AND MODERN
SOCIAL SCIENCE
As I pointed out in the
introduction, one probl<Lenj
with much of mainstream political
science is that it;;s
view of human nature is seldom
clearly articulated and
the connection between its tacit
assumptions about man
and the methods of social study are
never appreciated.

This is an unfortunate state of affairs
because the view
of human nature underlying the work
is not subject
to

systematic examination.
Yet in the work of such mainstream
political scientists
as Robert Dahl we can find hints of a
view of human nature,

and we can see that certain modes of explanation
become
more plausible when we become aware of the
underlying

assumptions about human nature.

And finally, as with Ilobbes,

the view of man and of science is accompanied by a
consistent

stance on moral discourse.
Dahl comes the closest to a direct statement on human

nature in a discussion of political participation in his

introductory text on the methods of political science,
Modern Political Analysis .

In the chapter on political

man he is concerned to oxplnin the lack of any widespread
and intense political involvement, except under exceptional
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circumstances, in democratic
political orders. During
the
explanation he .akes the phenomenon
see. both necessary
and predictable, and
significantly, to sustain his
point
of view he makes the following
observation:
Just why political involvement
is not more
rewarding, for more people is
a question ?or
whxch no Short or easy answer
is possible!
Ihe explanation, no doubt, turns
on the
"^"^
instinct a reasonable,
Itlloli^l civic-minded Deinfj.
reasoning?,
most xrnperxous desires and the Many of his
source of nmny
of hxs inost powerful gratifications
can be
tiaced to ancxcnt and persistent
biological
and physiolof.ical drives, needs,
and
Organized political life arrived late wants.
in
man's evolution; today man learns
how to
behave as a political man with the
aid and
often with the hindrance of instinctive
equipment that is the product of a
prior developii.ent. To avoid pain, lone
discomlort, and hunf^er, to satisfy drives
for
sexual gratification, love, security,
and
respect these needs are insistent and
primordial. The means of satisfying them
quickly and concretely generally lie outside political life.i

—

Dahl does not present here a pure variant
of abstract
individualism. Yet he is convinced that much of
the. most
significant behavior in organized societies is explained

by given biological drives.

As we shall see, he also

holds that the way in which systems evolve depends upon

how and to what extent these given needs are met.
Robert A. Dahl, ?>iodern Political Analysis second ed.,
(Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Uall I969), p. 80,
,

,
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Human Nature and the Conception
of Science in Dahl
Dahl's approach to the study of
societies reveal:.s
the connection between his
conception of .an and

the natur<

of science.

Like Hobbes he breaks society
down into a
number of component parts or
systems, such as the political system,
social system, and economic systei..
And
like ilobbes he believes in the
importance of

using

precisely defined terms in order to study
societies.
As in the case of most modern social
scientists he
stresses the need to operationalize
concepts. Concepts
must be defined so that they can be
measured by a series

of empirical tests.

The operational requirement of

mainstream political science is based on the
Hobbesian
assumption that language is meaningful only when
it

reflects the world out there.-'
The intent underlying this precise breakdown
is to

find the laws governing the relationship among
the systems
of society and the general laws of social development.
As in the case of Hobbes the laws sought are to be
causal
bee for instance Dahl s attenrpt to operationalize the
concepts of power and influence in Modern Politica l
Analysis Ch. 5.
'

.

3 An

excellent critique of this position can be found
in Hannah Pitkin, Wit t /-.enst ein and Justice
(Berkeley:
University of Caliiornia Press, 1?72)
.
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laws— his search

is for those antecedent factors
which

invariably precede and produce particular
sorts of change.
He is convinced that patterns of historical
chan.^e
are

recurrent and when the proper antecedent factors
have
been identified particular changes can be
predicted.

Thus such factors as the distribution of wealth,
the rate
of economic growth, and the openness of formal
political
access are seen as determining the pattern of
influence
and degree of stability within the polity.'

Dahl and his peers would be the last to claim that
they have succeeded in creating

a

science of politics

having the elegance or precision of Newtonian physics.
but such an achievement remains the goal.

In a discussion

of the conditions of underdevelopment and patterns of
change, Dahl makes some of the following remarks:

Because the path to the present that each
country has taJcen is in some degree unique,
every country has a somewhat different
legacy of conditions bearing on the chances
for polyarchy and peaceful adjustment. In
a sense much of the rest of this chapter is
an attempt to find patterns of explanation
in those richly different historical legacies.

The way in which political resources are
distributed among the people of a country
tends to viiry with its level of socioeconomic development.
With some important
exceptions inequalities in the distribution
of political resources are greatest in
countries with agrarian societies, less
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in industrial countries,
and lea<^t -ir, ^""'^^^^
^
at the stage or high
.a^s-consS^^tion .

The generalization stated
above is of course not a
law.
Most Of the conclusions of
modern political science
rernain at the level of
probabilistic stateu^ents-the
precise concatenation of variables
which determine a given
result has not yet been established,
yet exact laws remain
the eventual goal,^ and
philosophically the basic assumption remains the proposition that
causal patterns may be
determined. The only problem acknowledged
is the practical
one of isolating all the relevant
variables, for societies
are more complex but not different
in kind from
the

entities studied by the natural scientist.

Human Nature and Social Science in Concrete
Problems
Some specific problems examined by Dahl show
the

working of his method and its connection to an
abstract
individualist conception of man. A favorite preoccupation of social scientists during the late fifties
and
k
5

QP«

cit

.

Dahl, pp. 65 and 69.

A critique of operationalism and the quest for laws
of political behavior analogous to those in natural science
can be found in yilliam E. Connolly, The Ternis of l^olitical
Discourse. (Lexington: D. C. Heath Co,, forthcoming)
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early sixties was to explain the
stability of American
democracy. The pattern of explanation
they used clearly
exemplifies the connection of their
implicit conception
of human nature and their understanding
of social science.
Dahl argues that conflicts within
.Vmerican society were
able to be fit within a broad framework
of consensus and
willincness to compromise because l) the
pattern of social
cleavages was cross-cutting, and 2) the size
of the economic
pie was large and constantly grov/ing so that
conflict

would tend to be focused on the distribution
of increments.
No one was faced with the extreme pain of
absolute loss.

These factors constituted a large part of the
explanation
of stability and in turn generated a set of
conclusions
about the factors which would have to be promoted to

insure pluralist stability in other lands,

A number of critical and very convenient assumptions
about human nature are being made in this analysis.

These

assumptions are also found in much of the end of ideology
literature^ which became popular in the fifties and

early sixties.

The argument is that the growth of a

large economic surplus will blunt ideological concerns

and make possible a politics of pragmatic compromise.

The

^For a discussion of the themes In this literature see
M. Rejai, ed., Decline of Ideology
(New York: Atherton
Press, 1971),
.
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assumption is that human bein^rs have
certain desires,
especially for material comforts, and
that

once these

are met the desire to participate
in rational dialogue
about the ^joals of the political and
economic system will
decline. This view posits the universality
of certain

desires and uses them as a way of explaining
social
chance. Also connected with this view are
abstract

individualist assumptions about the relationship
of
reason and passion. Reason is seen as playing
essentially
an instrumental role.

When confronted with the given

passions, here the desire for material comforts,
reason

creates rationalizations about justice, ideologies to

justify the meeting of these desires or temporarily
soothe the ego for their lack of satisfaction.

That the task of reason in Dahl often is to create

rationalizations for given needs is also clear from his
treatment of authority and legitimacy.

Dahl treats

authority as a specialized and more reliable form of
influence.

It is one more tool which men in power will

strive to use.

Leaders will fashion moral arguments in

order to make their rule seem more plausible.

Reason

follows the tasks set for it by the underlying desires:

Authority is a highly efficient form of influence.
It is not only more reliable and
durable than naked coercion, but it also
enables a ruler to govern with a minimum

25
It would be impossible
to rely on foar and terror,
for
carry out the complex tasks of a example, to
large,

modern
bureaucratic organization such as the
i
Post 01 lice ... or the public
sc?,.ool system
of New York
When a subordinate rerards
the orders and assir-ninent s he
receives as
morally binding, only a relatively
small expenditure of resources, usually in the
form
ol salaries and wages, is
necessary to ensure
satlslactory performance,'
.

.

.

T

.

Reason is regarded as an instrument which
bends to the
given task. ,Vny argument which works is
seen as giving
Its author legitimacy. Yet in our ordinary
discourse v.e
distinguish between arguments which represent mere
"manipulation" and those which establish the legitimacy
of

a given authority.

Reason can serve as rationalization,

but it may also fashion generally accepted and
acceptable

criteria which will shape the perception of needs within
the social system.

As such it is in some sense a creator

of tasks and not merely a slave,
Dahl's view denies what the social view of man discussed in the next chapter affirms, that the concepts men

develop in their social lives help to constitute their
forms of interaction and that tliese may change in ways

which will leave men with new and even quite unpredictable
needs.

The whole pattern of social development may change

as men come to have a new view ol

Op
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Dahl, p.

^tl.

the good life, and this

View .a. „et .e tr.ce.ble
to Cannes i„ .o-oalle.
u„ae.I^„, ...,„.3,
such as ecouoMic ^rcth.
,„at universal drives
be so few, so
amorphous, and so full,
shaped h,

^n-. social existence

as to he
useless for predictive
pu..poses is not considered.
The individualistic vien of humn
nature is convenient for
Dahl because it allows hi,
to Plug in certain highly
focused economic desires,
posited as unlversals, and come out
with general laws, a
requirement of his
Philosophical method. He can
conclude that economic growth
has promoted social peace because
it meets certain universal
desires,

desires which determi.ne the
behavior of the person.

The view of
hu^an nature and the quest
for law-like regularities
are fully
consistent with and reinforcing
of each other. Without such
a viev
of human nature one could
not assign law like status
to the generalisations based on this evidence
nor would one be seeking
generalisations of a law-like form. As
will be pointed out later in the
chapter, the generalizations sought
within a social view will be gained
In other ways and will have a
different
status.

Not only Dahl's explanation of
the stability of American

government but also his whole conception
of the structure of our

society can be better understood in
terms of his abstract Individualist
conception of himan nature.

His approach to the distribution of
power

reflects his atomistic perspective.

On this matter his research

begins by choosing three
controversial issue areas and
then
deteraining who participates in
the decisions.
He shows
that different elites participate
in each issue area and
concludes that no single power
elite is responsible for
policy in New Haven and that each
irnportant group in
the

urban area can have some impact
on the policy questions
by which it is most affected.^

Bachrach and Baratz point out one way
in which Dahl's
approach to the distribution of power
is questionable.
Even if certain groups have clearly
developed interests
they may be unable to find or construct
the proper
.

or-

ganizational mode by which these interests
can be expressed
in the political system. ^ Yet the problem
hero
goes even

deeper and is best examined by a brief discussion
of Dahl
approach to the concepts of interest and power.

•

Dahl tests

power by measuring one's ability to realize a stated
preference. This view is close to the Hobbesian notion
that

power is the ability to achieve some future apparent good.
Thus Dahl looks to his three controversial issue areas
in which the ability of the participants to realize

their stated preferences can be tested.

Any stated

preference counts in the determination of who has power
8

Kobert A. Dahl, Who Governs?
University Press, I96I)

«

{New Haven:

9 Peter

Yale

Bachrach and Morton S. Baratz, "Two Faces of
Power," American Political Science Review 56 (I962)
pp. 9Z17-932.
,

•
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as lone as preferences are
not foreclosed by law or

intimidation JO

Yet this view disregards
the possibility
that power in its more subtle
ramifications may include
the ability of an individual
to shape the preferences
of
the other, often through
manipulation, in such a way that
the other fails to recognize
or promote his own real
interests. The individual in other
words may have stated
wants Which are not in his interest
and his agreement with
those in pov.er may create a false
consensus J ^

Dahl on the other hand assumes that
people have given
wants which constitute their real
interests. They know
these and can convert them into
issues if these wants
are insufficiently met.
Because he proceeds from an
individualist view of man and has an
instrumental view
of reason he does not seo that the social
patterns of
some lives may be such that they cannot
clearly formulate
their demands and may not have even a clear
sense of their
own needs.
The presence of a false consensus need
not

depend on our finding groups actually presenting
coherent
ideas or demands. A person can become a full
political
10

These ideas are developed most clearly in Robert A.
"A Critique of the Uuling Elite Model," in G.
William
Domhoff and Iloyt li. Ballard, eds
C. \;rif^ht Mills and the
Power Elite
(Boston:
Beacon Press, lybB), pp. 25-36?
Dahl,

. ,

,

^^This critique is indebted to a lecture by Steven Lukes
on "Three Concepts of Power" at the University of Massachusetts in the bpring of 1973 and to discussions of interes
and powei^ in Connolly, op. ci t
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participant only when ho or she has
had the opportunity to
develop a lan^a^o in which real
needs can be expressed.
For many years won.en in our society
have known that they
had problems-loneliness,
frustrations in dealing with
children, a lack of fulfillment
in their lives.
Yet

before certain social developments
and intellectual changes
occurred they could not see the
connection of their problems to structures beyond their
personal control. ""^

They saw their problems as personal
problems, as consequences of personal failings. It is an
impoverished
social science which will deal only with
clearly

articu-

lated wants already expressed as public
issues.

Dahl's failure to recognize the social
construction
of needs and issues leads him to assert
that most legitimate groups are represented in our political
system.

lie

sees different groups participating in each issue
area

and concludes that most needs are being responded
to

because there are different wants expressed in the political process, and many groups are apathetic on most
issues.

Their interests must not be affected for un-

fulfilled basic desires always lead to demands on the
12

For a fuller discussion of the relationship of issues
and personal troubles see C. Wright Mills, The Sociological
Imagination (London: Oxford University Press. 1959)
pp. 8-13.
.

13

Robert A. Dahl, Pref ctce to Democratic Theory
University of Chicago Press, I950), Ch. 5.

,

(Chicago:
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system.

DahLs troatmont of apathy

„,akos ev,n clearer th«

ato.,i»tlc «n<ier„l„„in,, or
hla approach.

„e ar,;uc.. that
in Western de.„ocraci,s
apathy should be the expected
nor,„

and political participation
the phenomenon which needs
oxplaininf^
of most men's lives are
act^vi.r''"^
activities anvolvaru: Tood, sex, lovu primary
family,
^'
work play, shelter, comfort,
friendship.
social esteem, and the like.
Activities
like those— not politics are
the primary
concerns of most men and women.
would clear the air of a f^ood deal .It
of cant
11 instead of assuminfv that politics
normal and natural concern of hmium is a
beinrs
one wore to make the contrary assumption
that lip service citizens may pay to
conventional attitudes, politics is a remote,
alien, and unrewarding: activity.
Instead
of seekinr: to explain why citizens are
not
interested, concerned, and active, the. task
is to explain why a J ew citizens are
,

—

.

*

'

.

^

.

Once again Dahl assumes that people have
certain given
drives which are determinants of their actions.
lie does
not consider the possibility that w© have created
the kind
of society whicli leads men and women to find
the satis-

factions of politics unrewarding;.
Ho believes that the interaction of competing elites
in a democracy fulfills the basic desires of the people

and so they will have no wish to get actively involved in
Op*

cit

.

Dahl,

V.'ho

Governs

«

p,

279,

politics.

Li,.e Jan,os

Mill he is in offset
tr.atinc political participation in terms
of opportunity costs. ^5
time one expends In politics
is painful and if one
does
not derive fro™ it n.cre
than an equivalent amount
of
payoff the participation isn't
worth it. If elected
leaders and leaders of interest
«roups are delivering
enough goods regularly then it
doesn-t ^ake sense to
participate
It is interesting to note
that even in a recent work

Where Dahl seeks to respond to such
critics as Jack V/alker,
vho has decried the lack of
concern for participation in
Dahl.s work,!^ the criteria used
to defend participation
are clearly still tied to an
individualist view of human
nature and limit the possible range
and efficacy of participation.
Dahl arguos that participation may be
a way
to

get What one wants, but he does not
discuss the possibility
that it may change and improve us as
people. His criteria
for authority are personal choice, competence,
and economy.

For a discussion of James Mill's conception
racy and representation and his use of opportunityof democcosts
see Alan Ryan, "Two Concepts of Politics
and Democracy:
James and John Stuart Mill" in Martin Fleisher,
ed
Machiavelli and the Nature of Political Theory (New
York^
Atheneum, 1972), pp. 76-113.
.

"•^Jack L. V;falker, "A Critique of the Elitist
Theory of
Democracy," American Political Scienc e Review-. 60 (1966)
pp. 283-295.
^

^

32

The criterion of personal choice
legitiiuates a decision
when one has the chance to pursue his
rational self-interest
provided others have an equal chance. The
criterion of
competence legitimates a decision if it is
made by a

person who is particularly qualified by some
skill. The
criterion of economy requires that the cains
of participation outweiGh the opportunity cost of time
lost from

other pursuits.''''

In many circumstances these criteria

will conflict with each other and applying them
to particular areas will require a delicate balancing act.

Yet

the very possibility that participation in the
right set-

ting may change and improve us, thus altering our very
needs, makes it impossible to apply such a balancing act
to questions of expanding participation.

Dahl

•

s

commit-

ment to an individualistic view of human nature becomes

clear in the kind of cost-benefit analysis of participation

which pervades his discussion of the economy criterion.
Thus Dahl declares that "if the rewards do not exceed
the costs,

it is looliiih of you to participate at all."

He further remarks that "the more likely it is that by

participating you will change the outcome in the direction
of your personal choice," the more attractive is partic-

ipation.

1

This view becomes problematic in ways Dahl

1

Robert A. Dahl, After the devolution
Yale University Press, I97I) Ch, 1.
,
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Ibid., p. 46.

.

(New Haven:
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does not consider if we entertain
the possibility that
participation itself may chan^^e and
broaden one's own
sense of his needs and wants.

Dahl

•

view is most con-

s

genial only when we assume the
permanence of stated needs,
as does an abstract individualist
conception of manj^
Dahl does believe that sooie kinds of
economic enterprise
are suitable for direct participation

,

in terms of his

three criteria, but if he reco^?nized the
intrinsic good
of participation he would be more concerned
with increasing
the number of social spaces in which direct
participation
would bo possible,

Dahl's view of man leads him to neglect the
possibility
that in some social structures one's sense of himself
and
of a worthwhile life may involve participation with

others in an effort to define the common good.

Participation

may itself create such a sense of need within the individual.
He may come to find this life more fulfilling than an

existence devoted to purely private acquisitiveness.

Highly individualistic calculations of the loss of time
and money may come to have only minimal relevance.

Dahl

does not consider that the great relevance of these
19

See a discussion of Dahl's conception of participation
in Peter Bachrach, "Interest, Participation, and Democratic Theory," (Unpublished paper).

20

Op«

cit

,

Dahl, After the Kevolution, Ch. 3.
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considerations in our culture may in
fact tell us something,
about our contemporary social system.
Once a^ain he tries
to turn these connections and
relationships into general
laws.
He doesn't consider that we may have
created men
who carry with them a Benthamite
calculus, thouf^h I would
argue that even these men are not pure
Benthamites and
could not be if we are to have any society
at all.

The picture of American democracy which
emerges from
all this is one which neatly integrates Dahl's
assumptions
about a deterministic social science and his
rather in-

dividualistic anthropology.

lie

pictures the political

system as one where groups continually feed Interests,
wants, into the political process and politicians
com-

promise these inputs in such a way that everyone doesn't
get all he wants but does get enough to make him happy.

The political system works with the causal efficiency
of the Newtonian universe.

One can predict that new

groups with new demands will be handled in the same

pluralist fashion.

If their demands are the sort that

can be processed by the system, they can eventually achieve

access and some of the valued goods.

Orthodox pluralists like Dahl find it hard to recognize that substantial groups within a culture may
to question the validity of

tlje

corae

whole pluralist picture

of society with its j^revalent image of man as bargaine?'.
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The atomistic view of man and the
causal, law-like view
of science makes them unable to
consider the possibility
that societies are communities
constituted in part by
their own self-conceptions and that those
conceptions
are subject to change often in
unpredictable ways.
Pluralists have absolutized one moment in
time and
converted it into a social law. And pluralism
itself
functions as a theoretical system which has
helped to

create the identity it clairas to describe.

It has

contributed a moral defense of the status quo while
claiming to be only scientific and thus value

neutral.

I will say more about this when I discuss
concepts of

human nature and the moral stance one takes toward

various communities.
Dahl's Moral Stance
In Dahl's case we see that the conception of science

along with the picture of American democracy are sustained
by an atomistic view of man.

In addition he believes that

he cannot rationally defend moral statements.

The paradox

is that though his work does lend moral support to our

society, support unacknowledged by Dahl, and though Dahl
2

1

Analyses of the limitations of pluralist thought may
be found in V^llliam E. Connolly, ed. The J3ias of Pluralism
(New York:
Athorton Press, 19(^9) and in i(obert l-'aul Wolff,
The Poverty of LibGr:rlism (Boston: Beacon Press, I968).

.
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declares that he has a „,oral
preference for democracy.
his view or „,oral discourse
does not allow him to see
the v,ays in which his ,„oral
co„„„itn,ents and scheme of

explanation each reinforce the other.

He is thus not

in a position to scrutinize
critically important connections
Implicit in his own work.^^

Dahl basically shares with his
classic predecessor
a noncor^nitivist theory of
ethics,
While he does not
maintain that ethical terms are meaningless,
he does not
believe that any empiric.l foundation can
be found for
applying an ethical term to any given
institution. His

position is that the realm of fact
values are logically separate.

^.nd

the realm of

The possibility that

our values might influence our empirical
research is one
to be steadily guarded against.

The development of an

adequate science of politics depends upon sustaining
this
dichotomy:
So too,

the Empirical Theorist would argue,

22

^
For
a discussion of the problems and possibilities
here see U'illiam E. Connolly, "Theoretical belf-Consciousness" in William E. Connolly and Glen Gordon, eds.,
Soci'* 3 btructuro ..nd i-oliticra ^Dieory
(Lexington:
D. C.
Heath and Co., 197^0 PP ^0-o6.
23 A
discussion and critique of the noncognitivis
theory of ctliics may be found in Mary l/arnock, ]':thics
Since 1900 (London:
Oxford University Press, i960)
and Alasdair Macintyro, A Short History of Ethics,
(New York:
MacMillan and Co., i960)
,

»
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-

the truth or falsity of
empirical propositions about politics does not
depend on what we think ou^ht to lo^;ically
what in fact is. And no matter be but
what
famous emperor thought or protended that
to
think, as he paraded before his
subjects
he was not wearing any clo thes
*

!

-^'-^

Thus the working social scientist
can only unearth
the facts and establish correlations
among them. This
view fits nicely with the belief that
human beings
act

out of given urges and behave inevitably
in certain

predictable ways.

The realm of reason reflects the

given instincts and does not alter the nature
of social
interaction. The same total ideology operative

in llobbes

Is present also in the work of Dahl,
In the course of these first

U-^o

chapters a number of

Important philosophical terms and issues have come
up,
such as causal laws and the separation of reason and
emotion.

The full significance as well as the inadequacie

of the views summarized here can be made clear only after

examining the contrasting social view of hum^^n nature
espoused so clearly by Rousseau.

We shall find that this

view suggests a different conception of the study of
society and opens up potentially far deeper criticisms
of our society than can be developed within an atomistic
0P»
p. 103.

cit

.

Dahl, Modern Political Analysis first ed.,
.

understanding of

,„„„.

The ro.nalnder of thl« thesis
will

bo conoernod „ith dolineutin,:
a social view of

implications and with the defense
of this view.

„,a„

and

it,
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ROUSSEAU AND

11

A P T E R

TIIE

III

SOCIAL CONCEPTION OF MAN

A careful analysis of Kousseau's IDiscourse
on the
^"^^^^"^

^

Inequality illuminates the difference betxvoen
his social and developmental conception of
hunian nature
and an atomistic understanding of man.
To becor.ie clear
about Rousseau's views and about the ways in
which later
social views of man are deeply indebted to him
it is

necessary to consider specifically his conception of
the relationship between reason and passion and
his

understanding of the nature of morality before society
exists.

Perhaps the best way into these issues is to

contrast Hobbes and Rousseau with reference to the changes

society makes on natural man.
To Rousseau society has a radical effect on man's

nature whereas Ilobbes assumes that society leaves in tact
and merely reinforces the basic human instincts.

Though

Rousseau has often been falsely accused of bein.j a
primitivist who wanted to see a return to an uncivilized
state of nature,^ ho in fact attributed a major role to
^See Ernst Cassirer, Rousseau Kant
and Goethe
(Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 19^5 ) for a
discussion and critique of this view.
,

,

,

ko

society in the developn^ent of
persons.

He did not regard

it as a mere auxiliary outgrowth
of certain preformed

drives.

Society basically alters the nature
of man.
And
to Rousseau the principal alteration
is that it makes us
social beings. Even those acts which
we call egoistic
have to be understood in a way different
from Hobbes's

conception of them.

But before we can discuss these

questions adequately, some preparatory ground
must be
covered first.
In the introduction to the Second Discourse

.

Rousseau

remarks that the task of unearthing real human
nature is
extremely difficult because man has been so greatly
altered
by society. It is liard for us even to imagine what
man
is like outside society and consequently many authors

project onto an original human nature tendencies they
observe in their own societies.
The human soul, like the statue of Glaucus
which time, the sea and storms had so much
disfigured that it resembled a wild beast
more than a god, the human soul, I say,
altered in society by the perpetual succession of a thousand causes, by the acquisition
of numberless discoveries and errors, by the
changes that have happened in the constitution of the body, by tl.e perpetual jarring
of the passions, has in a manner so changed
in appearance^i^s to be scarcely distinguishable.
2

'Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Discourse on the Origin of
Inequality Lester G. Crocker^ cd.
("New York:
j.ashington
Square Press, I967), p. I67.
.

,

^1

To sec how .uch ve have
been tran.for.ned by society,
it is
necessary Tor us to perrorn. an
act of imagination which
Will allow us to thinl. about
.an in his pre-social state.
IX. this condition
Housseau imagines rwan had (or
would
have) only two very .generalized
instincts, self-preservation
and pity.
But .nan in the state of
nature is not evil nor
Is life in the state of nature
a war of all against
all.

In his pre-social state

.nan

acts out of momentary needs.

He will kill animals or pick
fruit as he is hungry, but
he has no forethou^.ht about future
needs because he cannot
think. He has no concept of future
and no concept of mine
and yours. These are all social
concepts. They depend
on a rudimentary society and the
development of lan^ua^e

The philosophers, who have examined
the
foundations of society, have all perceived
the necessity of tracing? it back to a
state
of nature, but not one of them has ever
got
there.
Some of them have not scrupled to
attribute to man in that state the ideas of
justice and injustice, without troubling;
themselves to prove that he really i.iust have
had such ideas, or even that such ideas were
useful to him: otliers have spoken of tlie
natural ri^^ht of every v.iau to keep what
belon.^s to him, without lottin/r us Icnow
what they meant by the word bolonrr others,
without furtlier ceremony ascribing; to the
stron/joot an authoiity over the weakest,
have immediately brought /rovornmejit into
bein/f, without thinkin/^ of the time requisite for men to form any notion of the thinrra
si/jnified by the words authority and ,';ovornment. All of thorn, in fine, constantly
harpin^C on wants, avidity, opprcsi.ion,
desires and pride, have transferred to the
;

k2

state of nature ideas picked up in the
boso ni
of society.
In speakinjij of savages thev
described citizens.

Before the existence of settled society
it thus makes no
sense. to speak of man as having evil
instincts. Before
society there can be brief conflict if two
hungry men
converge on a rabbit, but there is no war
because grudges
and revenge are out of place when there is
no concept of
past wrongs or even of person for that matter.
In the

pure state of nature man runs when he is afraid
and he is
always satisfied when his momentary instincts are
met. The
sort of man Ilobbes describes is really a civilized
man

developed within and adapting to a particular form of
society.
But eventually a number of historic accidents combine
to produce society and transform man.

As the population

increases men interact more frequently and rudimentary

societies begin to emerge.

The growth of society means

the development of institutions and language.

liousseau

has a stronr: sense of the centrality of language, and such

modern philosophers as Wittgenstein and Vinch echo his
analysis on this point.

Rousseau sees language and social

institutions as complexly interv^oven.
•^

Ibid.

,

p.

176.

It is hard,

he says,
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to imat-ine n,on abl. to interact
regularly without languace
and yot it is hard to imagine the
growth of language before

society exists.
The first (difficulty) that offers
itself is
how languaf-es could become necessary;
for
as there was no correspondence
between men
nor the least necessity for any, there
is no
conceiving the necessity of this invention,
nor the possibility of it, if it was
not
indispensable. I mif^ht say, with many others,
that languae;e3 are the fruit of the
domestic
intercourse between fathers, mothers, and
children:
but this, besides its not answering the difficulties, >yould be committin^^
the same error as those, who reasoning on
the state of nature, transfer to it ideas
gathered in society, always consider families
as livin^^ together under one roof, and their
members as observing among themselves a union,
equally intir.jate and permanent as that which
exists among us, where so many common interests
unite thera;^

Somehow th© two grow together, and Rousseau implies that
no neat temporal priority or causal connection can be

established here.

The relationship between language

and thought is analogously complex.

V/e

cannot imagine

th© creation of language except by men who can think,

but conversely one cannot conceive of complex thought

apart from language

Rousseau obviously stands in awe of the complex and
basic relationship of language to human life as we know
it.

The relationship between language and human develop-

ment is crucial.

Language is crucial to institutional

life by relating men to each other in systematic ways.
Ibid,

,

pp, 192-193.

Th« roles we play are constituted by
the general abstract
system of language. He strongly
disagrees with the
Hobbesian notion that language merely
describes a prcviously existing reality. Once language
and institutions
exist, the basic nature of man is
changed. These changes
have good and bad aspects.
In the first place, with the growth
of language and

institutions, it now makes sense to speak of
right and
wrong ways of doing things as well as of
moral right and
wrong in general. Rousseau argues that we are
transformed
by society into moral beings, and he nieans this
in
a

radiccil sense.

His contemporary, David Hume, had argued

that society malces us raorel, but to Hume morality
is a
set of rules of efficiency.

what helps or hurts. ^

Social experience teaches us

To Rousseau the growth of society

makes us moral by giving us wants and needs we would not

otherwise have.

Vo come to prize a given set of relation-

ships because part of our identity is tied up in these

institutional relationships.
of self-interest.

We are not beings simply

Thus the "family man" makes sacrifices

for his family not simply because it is a source of pleasure to him but because he comes to regard himself as a
5

John Plaraenatz, Man and Society
McGraw Hill Book Co., I963}, Ch. 10,

,

Vol. I,

(Nev

4->rk:
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family man and to know that h«
is so regarded by those
in his family and community.
It may then result that
he
feels a kind of happiness from
his fulfillment

of the rol

but he does not act for the sake
of that pleasure.
Implicit in this discussion is a
rejection of tho

abstract individualist's view of the
relationship between
reason and passion. In the Hobbesian
tradition reason is
instrumental. Its role is to find satisfactory
outlets
for the gratification of the passions.
In the often

quoted though somewhat ambiguous phrase of
Hume, reason i
and ever ought to be the sl^lve of the
passions. But once
we say that the development of concepts and
institutions

gives a person a new identity we can no longer
take so
simplistic a view, for we are really arguing that
reason

itself helps mold the passions and thus that the conceptual development occuring in a given society will have

much to do with tho nature of the passions prevailing
there.

There is a complicated interdependency which

cannot be expressed in simple causal terms.

As Alasdair

Maclntyre remarks, a passion is not just what it is as a
toothache is what it is whether you or
Our thoughts about the passions, the

I

think about it.

v/ay

we break up the

world conceptually, affect the nature of them as "passion:
We have a scheme for interpreting our emotions and our
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conception of these emotions depends
on this scheme/
^.'hen 1 fool gratitude
toward you I am not auton^at
ically
responding to some inner physiological
state within
nie

to x.hich I always attach the
word gratitude.

you have intentionally done
no call on you.

,ne

son.o

I

bel^.eve

good for which I had

My feeling of gratitude may be
associated

with a "warm feeling,., but that feeling
will be understood
and in part constituted by my
recognition
of our total

relationship and thus my comprehension of
a number of
related concepts and actions.

Rousseau explicitly rejects a neat separation
of
reason and passion when he declares that
each is greatly
indebted to the other.
Let moralists say what they will the
human
understanding is greatly indebted to the
passions, which, on their side, are likewise universally allowed to be greatly
indebted to the human understanding. It
is by the activity of our passions, that
our reason improves; we covet knowledge
merely because we covet enjoyment, and
it is impossible to conceive, why a man
exempt from fears and desires should take
the trouble to reason.
The passions, in
their turn, oAve their origin to our needs,
and their increase to our progress in
science; for we cannot desire or fear
anything, but in consequence of the ideas
we have of it, or of the simple impulses
of nature
;

Alasdair Maclntyre, "Reason and Passion:
Tradition," (Unpublished paper).
Op*

cit

«

rtousseau, pp.

I88-I89.

The Modern

^7

He also makes it clear that needs are
socially created.
These social needs may bear sopjc relationship
to the

original given instincts, but they are so
altered and
expanded by society as to be virtually new.
This appears to me as clear as daylight,
and I cannot conceive whence our philosophers can derive all the passions they
attribute to natural man. Except the bare
physical necessities, which nature herself
requires, all our other needs are merely
the effect of habit, before which they were
not needs, or of our cravings; and we don't
crave that which we arc not in a condition
to know.
Hence it follows that as savage
man longs for nothing but Avhat he knows,
and knows nothing but what he actually
possesses or can easily acquire, nothing
can be so caln as his^soul, or so confined
as his understanding,*^
*

Human beings are not, then, prisoners of fixed instincts whose reason is tied to the task of finding outlets for these instincts.

They are beings with a con-

ceptual and institutional past who cannot throw off

concern for their moral responsibilities.

^Vnd

they are

both descendants and creators of this past.
So much of man's identity is created by his presence

in society that there is no turning back.

Just as it is

almost impossible to imagine what man was originally like,
so it is inconceivable that man could completely repudiate

Ibid.

.

p.

254.

^8

the social nature of his existence.

Thus despite the fact

that some commentators persist in
seeing

hin,

as a prim-

itivist, Housseau explicitly rejects
the idea that wo can
ever go back to a happier state of nature.
There is no
return to the Garden of Eden, which in
any case to Rousse au
was not idyllic because it lacked a sense
of good and evil.

Rousseau does believe that much of the history
which
creates us has been unfortunate. Thus through
a historical
accident property was invented and with property
came

Inequality.

Inequality produced in some men the need to

dominate, and it made all men insecure.

longed and violent conflict.

It led to pro-

He agrees with Hobbes that

human life under some circumstances can be a war of all
against all, but these are "civilized" beings who carry
on the war.

They are creatures of the institution of

property and the moral code and sense of identity which
property creates.

But paradoxically some moral codes

limit the range of human awareness and thus blunt the

full development of man's potential,

Basic to llousseau's thought is the view that some

passions are better than others.
structure create passions

A^'hich

Some forms of social

bring men closer to-

gether and create a more harmonious society.
coiiibine

Men can

independence and a sense of responsibility to and

for others.

Though Ftousseau believes that society creates
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needs, he docs not push this toward
a cultural relativii-sni
which sanctions all forms of society.
But because hi
1X3

historical sense is so strong he is not one
to push for
rapid, radical changes.
Stfindards by which to

judge and

•

direct the course of historical change are
however relevant and ,nay be derived from man's capacity
for rationality
and moral growth. Though every society has
its ongoing

institutions and moral codes, there are certain universal
moral parameters which may be applied to all societies
and these parameters contain the only adequate justif-

ication for the loss of man

»

s

natural independence.

I

will return to this topic when I discuss the relationship
a social conception of human nature and the evaluation of

societies.

At that juncture an examination of the Social

Contract will be in order.

Men can apply moral judgments even to their own
societies because, while children of history, they are
not trapped by history.

As conceptual beings we are

aware of the right way to do things, but because we

create these concepts we can also bring about change.

Concepts are constantly being altered as we seek to apply
them to new situations and consider new Information.

Thus

w© need not remain trapped in established ways of doing

things as would mere stimulus-response beings:

•

.the

boast cannot deviate from the rules that have been pre-
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scribed to it, even in cases where
such deviation might
be useful, and man ofton deviates
Irom the rules laid
down for him tho his prejudice,
As we shall
see.

such

modern philosophers as Winch have drawn
heavily on the
Insifrhts implicit in this remark.

Philosophical Arpunients between Ilobbes and
R ousseau
The conception of man as a social beine,
one Avhose
emotions are in part constituted by his social
environment
and whose actions are not to be treated in
mechanistic
causal fashion, is buttressed by a number of
important

philosophical arguments.

These involve a discussion of

some of the important differences between Ilobbes and

Rousseau
Hobbes has frequently been criticized for deemphasizing the extent to which social institutions apart
from the formal political system are a source of order
in society.

While accepting this criticism,

I

think it

is possible to ^o even deeper and show that the Hobbesian

notion of sovereicnty is really an outgrowth of an inadequate view of morality and moral concepts.

And the

lack of an adequate moral and social perspective on human
9 Ibid.

,

p.

186.

nature leads to certain crucial
incoherences in Hobbes
thought. These suggest problems with
any atten.pt to hold
consistently to such an atomistic view of
man.
As has been pointed out, the Hobbesian
view of human
nature is e^^oistic and deterministic.
Human beings are

creatures of emotion driven by fixed,
permanent needs.
Power is a means to achieve future emotional
gratification
and human reason is merely instrumental.
These characteristics are not altered by the inception of
the social
contract, which is itself an instrument of
hedonic
egoism.

The Hobbesian conception of moral discourse
is an out-

growth of these premises, and this conception is
present
in modern positivism and thus in much contemporary
political
science, though its ancestry and full philosophical
basis

is neither recognized nor admitted.

Hobbes declares

that what we call good, in other words the meaning of
this moral concept, is that which satisfies an immediate

private pleasure.
It follows from the Hobbesian conception of man that

the justification of sovereignty is its preservation of

order

— all

we may reasonably expect of any functioning

state is that it preserve order.

If we ask more and

demand justice society easily reverts to anarchy.

Hobbes

is able to make such an assumption because he does not

have a satisfactory theory of moral development.

He
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assumes that within society men
continue to interact in an
external, manipulative, deterministic
way--other men are
only potential instruments of my
pleasure and so I will
manipulate them in accordance with
the goals determined
for me by my passions.

'

Now one would be foolish to deny

that this is an accurate picture
of some aspects of relationships Within society, but it is
extremely problematic
to draw this as a picture of every
aspect of all human

relationships.
The Rousseauian argument that human
nature is changed
significantly in society is buttressed by a
close look at
language itself. Ve have a whole vocabulary
which reflects
the fact that we regard other human beings
as conscious
freely choosing moral agents. Wo say that we
resent x's

behavior only when we attribute intention to him.
We do
not resent a rock falling off a cliff and
damaging

our car.

In society we enter into a whole series of
relationships

where w© cease to treat other persons as objects.

V/e

would find it very difficult if not impossible to
get along
without the moral vocabulary of resentment, love,
obligation
Once one understands how elements of choice are built
into
our most vital human relationships, conventional determinist
10

Strawson, "Freedom and Resentment," in P. F.
Strawson, od., studios in the I'hilosophy of Thoug ht and
Action, (New York:
Oxford University Press, 19ob77
P. F.
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these which view our actions and
ideas as controlled by
given passions become hard to sustain.

m

fact the

understanding of another person as a
consciously choosing
agent and the recognition that he
sees
us as such is an

important part of what we know as human
existence.
Because the concept of eruilt is so
integrally related
to our moral and social life, a close
examination of this
concept can provide additional support for
the interdependent arguments I have been making about
the social
nature of man and the inability to separate
neatly reason
and passion. As John Rawls points out,^^
guilt is a complex
concept which involves ideas we develop in our
social

relationships with others.

In the first place the concept

Is related to other concepts such as right,
fairness,

obligation.

If we did not have these other concepts

and the kind of social practices with which they are

interwoven we could not speak of guilt as we know it.

Secondly the concept of guilt is susceptible to varying
degrees of complexity as one develops within a society.
Thus in a situation where a pex^son has been taught to
love,

obey,

and trust a figure in authority who treats

one well, he will feel what Rawls calls authority guilt

^^John Rawls, "The Sense of Justice," Review of Phil osophy 72 (1963).
.
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when he violates the injunctionn of
the authority.
But
as an individual develops in
society, learning, new and
broader roles, a more complex concept
of r.uilt will be

developed
If we imafrine a /rroup of individuals
involved in a

cooperative enterprise the rules guidin^j
which are fair
and known to be fair, the individuals
involved will
develop a sense of trust and friendship.
Through joint

participation in the activity they become closely
bound
to their follows.
They see them intentionally living

up

to the rules of the game and develop a sense
of respon-

sibility to the others.

If in this situation an individual

violates the rules of the game, he will feel guilt, a
feeling which will manifest itself in several ways, including an inclination to make good the loss to others
and to accept the penalties.

The individual who avoids

actions which make him foci guilty thus is not responding
to some simple inner physiological state.

His feelings

grow out of his complex understanding of the world

embodied in his concepts and social institutions.
Language and the social roles with which it is

connected make possible the development of

a state of

reciprocal consciousness among human beings.

I

know

that a given task is part of my role and the otlier

person knows that

I know.

The value of this typo of
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experience lies in a state of consciousness
between two
human beings;
it does not nmke reference
to a state

of feeling of one isolated being,
as in the conventional
instances of egoism or altruisn,. The
growth of a whole
set of institutional ties among
people creates a large
possible set of reciprocal relationships
and fundamentally
changes the nature of man.
It makes us moral beings
be-

cause our mere existence now as social,
rational beings
implies a whole new set of responsibilities.
We can evade
these but we cannot be fully unconscious of
them because
they arc now a large part of our identity.

These considerations about the nature of language

constitute no final proof of the invalidity of an
atomistic
and deterministic view of man.
But if human bein-s really
are the causally controlled atoms of Hobbes and much of

contemporary social science, beings driven by innate
passions, one will have an enormous problem explaining
the existence and subtle nuances of some of the most

Important ideas in our vocabulary, ideas we could hardly
imagine getting along without.
I would

ar,']rue

that the whole vocabulary of good and

evil grows out of social existence and reflects our per12

Robert Paul i/olff

,

The Poverty of Liberalism

.

Ch.

5.
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ception of others as conscious agents
and our realization
that we arc siinilarly perceived.
This comrmnal life is
the source of our humanity and
our moral concepts are
airbed, at preservi^.^ that
coinniunity.
Moral concepts are

aimed at furthering
not

..y

interest only if by interest we

nu.an

private egoistic pleasure but the full
human development which community life makes
possible.
niy

Conclusion

Rousseau thus presents a thoroughgoing attack
on all
the basic postulates of abstract individualism.
Passions
arc not simple given entities; rather our
needs develop
in society.

They are complex and changing.

Nor can we

speak of them as determining behavior in any simple
way.
The rational dialogue occurring within society has
an

impact on these and so a neat separation of reason
and

passion must be rejected.
to this dialogue and so,

The individual contributes
as we shall see,

law-like

treatment of human behavior after the fashion of natural
science is not appropriate.
I have shown that tliere are solid philosophical

reasons to support this view of man.

This conception

carries with it important consequences both for how we
study society and how we evaluate it.

Some modern

philosophers are indebted to a Housseauian conception
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of

in thoir effort to suggest
so.ne of the limitations
of conten^porary niethods in the
social sciences. In the
n.an

next chapter I will show that
Peter Uinch, one of the
leading critics of a natural science
approach to society,
does proceed fron assumptions on
human nature close to
Rousseau's. Then I will discuss sorne
aspects
of the

method of social science he advocates.
will advance

son^e

In the process I

reasons for accepting such a conception

of social science.

Before I can finish discussion of a social
conception
of man something raust be said about the
moral stance which
it generates.
Thus far I have only alluded to this
issue.

Because there are differences between Rousseau
and V/inch
on this very important issue and because both
differ

from

the modern noncognitivist theory of ethics, I will
devote

all of chapter five to these questions.

I will argue that

the recognition that human bein-s are in part constituted

by their societies need not end in the relativistic

assertion that all societies are equally good.
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CHAPTER
SOCIAL SCIENCE

.U\D

IV

THE SOCIAL CONCEPTION OF MAN

The social and moral view of man
espoused first so
clearly by Rousseau underlies much of
the current philosophical attack on positivism. The close
relationship
of concepts and action, the refusal to
accept
a simple

dichotomy of reason and passion, the rejection
of neat
causal mechanism in the explanation of human
action

have

all been important in this attack on
positivism.

Peter

Winch, drawing on the later work of V/itteonstein,
has

played a significant part in this attack.

His work

suggests that a view of man and of social science
have

helped to sustain each other, with dubious consequences
for each.

It is necessary to examine the work of Winch

in detail because he applies important arguments char-

acteristic of Rousseau to certain modern philosophical
problems as well as to contemporary social science.
The view of human nature held by Winch comes through
in his discussion of two topics which he considers to be

closely interdependent.

He begins The Idea of a Social

Science with an analysis of the nature of philosophy,

epistomology in particular.

His initial polemical target

is the "undcrlaborer" conception of philosophy.

This
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conception hold, that the task of
philosophy is to deal
with problen,3 that co.ne to it fro.
other areas. Philosophy
can toll us nothing about the world;
that is the job of

science.

Philosophy deals with linguistic
confusions
Which may develop in the course of
science.

Its real task

is to sharpen the tools with which
to examine the world.

The underlaborer conception of philosophy
rejects the
assumption that philosophy is an autonomous
enterprise.
Winch objects to this conception, which

he sees as

being dominant within the field, because it
assumes right
from the start a sharp distinction between
the world
and the language with which we try to describe
the world.

He denies that it can make sense to speak of an
indepen-

dent social reality which exists apart from the
concepts
we use to comprehend it.

Philosophy is concerned with

the relationship between language and reality and thus

with the nature of reality.

It is an autonomous discipline

which cannot be limited to problems brought to it from
without

.

The fields of metaphysics and episteraology

,

which

have always been the special preserve of philosophy,

therefore come in for close attention from Winch,

If the

philosophy of natural science is concerned with the
criteria of intelligibility in the natural sciences.

Peter Winch, The Idea of a Socia l Science and Its
Relation to Philosophy (Tendon: Uout ledge and Kegan
Paul, 19587, Ch. i.
«

"
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epistemolocy is concerned with the criteria of
intelligibility as such. This leads Winch into a discussion

of

what it is for a word to have meaning.

How do

I

know that

two objects with which I write are both instances
of the

same thing, pen?

It is only by following the rules built

into the concept pen that I can derive the criteria
which

allow me to make this judgment.

Built into or constituting

our concepts are rules which allow us to apply

thera to

various situations.
If we are to understand

V.'inch's

view of human action

and thus his conception of human nature, it is necessary
to follow his discussion of rules.

Me say that x is

following a rule only if we could in principle discover
the rule he is following.

Rules are public in the sense

that they can become clear to others in a social context.

Related to this condition is the requirement that if one
is following a rule it must be logically possible for

him to make a mistake.

If any possible action is con'

*

'

gruent with x's following a "rule" we would not want to
say that ho was following a rule.

again is vital because it

pcdnts

direction of a social context.

The notion of mistake

rule following in the
By mistake we mean that

an action is recognizably in contravention of established

ways of doing something.
^Ibid., pp. 30-32.

We cannot speak of a mistake
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unless we can speak of the possibility
that oth«r people
will point out ray action as a mistake.
Otherwise I may
continue to apply the "rule" as I like
and there is no

external chock on me.

The rule does not serve as any

limit to

This does not

niy

behavior.

n.ean that all

violations of rules must be spotted for us
to say that
the rules exist.
It means that the concept of

rule makes

no sense apart from a social context, public
criteria
and the possibility of checks for mistalces.
This dis-

cussion of intelligibility and rule following is
important because Winch has, through an analysis of
the nature
of language, related both lan^juage and action to a
social
context.

His philosophical analysis sustains and reflects

an assumption Rousseau shares; that we need society for

language and that the growth of society itself depends

upon the existence of language.
Winch's method in approaching this subject is fully
consonant with the substantive conclusions he is defending.
Aftei" a discussion of the meaningfulness of language

which has moved toward society, he then moves touard human
action itself, a concept which once again leads him back
to language and society.

A central distinction underlying Winch's examination
-^Ibid.

,

Ch. 2.
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of the concept of human action
is the contrast between
a
happening and human action. If a
tennis ball strikes my
head and I fall to the ^^round this
is exactly what happens
to me; but if in the middle of
the match I go to my ki.ees
in a particular posture, to "beg
for mercy,"
this is a

meaningful action different in kind from
the happening.
The action is symbolic in that it goes
together with other
actions in such a way as to commit me to
behaving in one
way rather than another. And I am committed
in
the future

by what I do now if my present act is the
application of
a rule.
Human action is rule governed and therefore
related
to a social context.
In other words actions can have

meaning only if they are rule governed and thus express
the concepts which help both to describe and constitute
the various forms of human interaction.

We cannot speak

of the actions of taking the marriage vow apart from
the concepts and rules which constitute this practice.

The practice does not soraehow exist and then social

scientists come along to invent a vocabulary to describe
it.

Human actions differ from happenings in that the

former are intrinsically related to the concepts which

describe and constitute them.
Implicit in the whole discussion of the relationship
of language to reality is the notion which V/inch inherits

from Rousseau and his tradition that society fundamentally
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Changes hu.an nature.

The importance of the social
context
in human action comes through
in an essay in which Winch
defends certain basic aspects of
Uousseau's conception
of human nature a^^ainst llobbes.

V/inch remarks:

"V.'here

Hobbes thinks that the citizen
must be taught what man's
nature unchangeably is, Rousseau's
view is that a man's
nature is created by his education."^
Winch would clearly
agree with Rousseau that we cannot
speak of men
in the

state of nature bein^, "evil" and
desiring the "property"
of others. In effect men in the
state of nature cannot
bo regarded as fully human though
they have the potentiality
to become hun.an.
For Winch to be human one must be
a
social creature with language who develops
needs through
his participation in society and who
learns rules through
language and then applies them to new and
changing situations.
'

Winch's recognition that we are social beings
coniJtituted in large part by the social and
linguistic
coiijmunities of which we are a part comes
through very

clearly in his discussion of the concept of
authority,
a discussion unefully contrasted with Dahl's.
k

Peter Winch, "Man and Society in llobbes and Rousseau,"
in Maurice Cranston and Richard S. Peters, eds
Hobbos
_and Rousseau
(Garden City:
Doubleday, 1972), p. 230.
. ,

.

6k

Winch's central point, as we have
seen is that hunan
action is rule governed. There .ust

be a right and a wron,,

way of doing thin^rs
the participants.

,

and this fact inust be understood
by

To participate in rule governed
activit xes

includes the acceptance of authority.

There cannot b e a

right and a wrong way of doing things if
the decision as
to what is right and i.rong is merely
arbitrary, a matter
of my own caprice. When it comes to
following rules
I

nmet as a matter of logic accept what
certain other people
say as decisive. Authority thus is not a
sort of influence,
but an internal, conceptual relationship among
persons and
one which is basic to social life,
V/hen we

alien will.

submit to authority we are not bowing to an
We are directed by the idea of the right way

of doing something in connexion

performing.

with the activity we are

The authoritative character of an individual's

will derives from its connexion with that idea of a right
way. 5

Winch is here arguing against Dahl's contention that

authority is simply one form of power.

The difference is

significant because it once again sug^-ests different

conceptions of human nature.
5

Authority to Winch is an

Peter Winch, "Authority" in Anthony (mint on, ed.,
Political Phil osophy (London: Oxford University Press,
,

1967), pp. 97'-101.
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xnternal set of relationships,
shared concepts basic to
society aa such. It is not
sor.ething added after the
fact
to secure certain ongoing
activities because

we could not
have t.,ese activities in the
first place without these
internal ties. Dahl sees society
as a set of individuals
in conflict for certain given
or instinctive (primary)
goals.

Authority is the construction after
the fact of rational
justifications for these goals and not
basic to the

social interaction out of which such
goals emerge.
In considering these points it is
important to reali;-ze
that Winch is not denying the possibility
of completely
conditioned behavior, for failure to see this
has been the

source of much misunderstanding of him.

He is denying

that fully conditioned behavior is human
action

.

The dog

who has learned a trick possesses a learning
different

from the man who has learned the number system.

In the

former case a given stimulus will always produce
the same
response.
In the latter case the man is applying a rule
and because ho knov/c the rule he can produce results
he

has never seen before and has never seen his teacher

produce.

ICnowledge of a rule is more difficult, but it

implies the possibility of creativity, the totally new
response.

The creativity opened up by language and

society is basic to the view of man.
On a related plane is the fact that language and
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society make us .oral bein^^s,
beings who are not merely
aton,s or self-interest.
Our concepts define for
us rules
of interaction with our
fellows and these constitute
our identity. Hunan beings
who act according to

rules
can know a right and a wron^way to do something;. As
soon as wo can be .aid to
understand what we do we can
be
said to act n^orally. For
exar.ple to respect the
rights
Of property involves knowledge
of its contradictory, what
it would be to do otherwise.
The understanding of rules
means that we are capable of
beconiing aware of an alternative to our conduct, and in so
far as we are rule
fjoverned beings we can choose to
do otherwise.
I^nowledge

and choice are key aspects of the
concept of moral behavior,
Thus the growth of language and society
inakes us moral

beings and it is only as we becoine
social beings in this
sense that we achieve full humanity.
Even if we could
give any meaning to such concepts as
conditioned
virtue,

it would be a denial of our full
humanity because it

robs us of our freedoms.

Winch's critique of Hobbesian atomism is
further
reinforced by his analysis of the relationship
between
reason and passion. lie argues that reason cannot

be torn

from the fabric of human life.^
^2R*. £ll^f

^^inch,

Th£

-T^'^ea

Because it develops in
of a Social Science

,

p.

100.
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the total fabric or life, it ,,ets
its shape froc and shapes
the passions of man.
The principles and precepts of
reason
all derive their sense from the context
of human activity
in ^.hd,ch they are applied.
Though accepting? Winch's

Sroundinc of reason and

lof^ic in on.'^oin^T societies,

I

will later criticize his attempt to make
criteria of
logic totally relative to the society being
studied.

Here,

and in an analof-ous way in the discussion
of moral discourse, his reco.-nition of the social nature
of man
is

pushed too far toward complete relativism.
Thus Uinch clearly shares Rousseau's repudiation
of
the atomistic view of man, a view developed in
the

utilitarian tradition and prevalent in muted form in much
of contemporary political science. We shall now want
to show that this social view of man also carries with
it
a far different approach to the study of man than that

employed by contemporary political science.

Vinch and the Study of Action

Coming out of the tradition of Wittgenstein, Peter

Vinch rejects the causal-predictivist approach to the
study of human behavior advocated by hobbos and Dahl.
He raakes a sharp distinction between the sort of expla-

nation appropriate to natural science and the kind which
is fittin/T in social science.

The distinction can be
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more clear by spelling, out in
abstract terms the
philosophy of science built into
the work of Dahl we
discussed above,
n.ade

a natural scientist seeks
a causal explanation
Of an event ho is trying to
identify recurrent re^^ularities
What kind Of event always
precedes the event in cjuestion?
If he can find events of type
iv-hen

A which always precede

events of type

B,

he will say that A causes B.

A is a

necessary and sufficient condition for
the occurrence of
B.
The natural scientist also insists
that events A be

fully distinct and separately
identifiable from events
B.
Through this approach he tries to arrive
at natural
laws • 7

Explanation of this type became immensely
popular
In physics during the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries,
largely in response to the discoveries of
Newton and the
subsequent application of Newtonian mechanics
to a whole

range of problems.

In the twentieth century this kind of

causal explanation has been carried over into
social
science.

As Thomas Kuhn has pointed out ^ in the history
,

7 Alasdair

Maclntyre, " The >Vntecedents of Action," in
Alasdaxr Maclntyre, Against the Sclf-Imn^es of the
Are.
(New York: Schocken, I97TJT
8

See Thomas Kuhn, The Structiire of Scientific Hevolutlons, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
I969JI
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of science one field often

con.es

through its success to

exercise a strong influence on other
areas.
When the physicist is trying to
determine the effects
of high speed neutrons on the nucleus
of the atom he has
set procedures or rules for determining
if two events
are of the same typo. These rules give
him the relevant
criteria of sameness. He has fixed ways for
establishing
niass and velocity, and he can say
that neutrons
of a

particular velocity can cause the fission of nuclei
of
a ^iven mass.
In this manner he can fashion a law
or

even a whole series of laws.

The motion of the subatomic particles is in no way

dependent upon the descriptions given by the scientists.
The criteria for determining the sameness of events are

merely the scientific community's.

Through this procedure

predictivist laws are to be established.

Laws must be

distinguished from rules, a point of great importanco
for the remainder of this analysis.

Laws exist indepen-

dently of the events they describe.

They are not norm-

ative principles

disobey them.

— tliere

is no obligation to obey or

They either apply or they do not apply.

If phenomena not predicted by a relevant law occur and
eventually lead the scientific community to construct
a new law, we say that the law has been overturned, not

that it has been violated.

In natural science we use laws

to predict events,

thoufrh whether the possibility
of

prediction is an adequate criterion of
good laws is a
debated topic ixmong philosophers of
science.
In tho social sciences there has
been an attempt to
apply the same procedures as the natural
scientists use
to fashion a science of society, one

which would embody

laws of society.

Thus social scientists construct def-

initions of social class, national wealth,
political
stability and seek correlations amonc these
factors in
the hope of cenerating laws or at least
probabilistic

ereneralizations.

They

v/ant

definitions which will allow

them to compare these factors cross-culturally
so that

instances of their operation can be compared to give
law like regularities.

The work of Dahl discussed above

is an excellent example of this quest, and we have seen

how in his work an atomistic conception of human nature

nicely sustains and is supported by these scientific
assumptions.

Winch's conception of human nature and human action
su^^gest that this whole approach to the study of man is
wrongr.

It is wrong in the ways v/hich it seeks to produce

generalizations and in the status assigned to the general
izations.
Let us consider the social scientist who wants to

correlate degrees of wealth with participation in politic
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Perhaps he wishes to establish
cross-culturally the generalization that those with .ore
wealth are more likely to

participate in politics.

If he is tryin^^ to be a good

behaviorist. he will take certain
observable criteria as
his operational definition of
wealth and of political

participation.

Winch would argue here that the behaviorist
has
systematically misunderstood human action,
for what

determines whether the degree of wealth x
has equals y's
degree of wealth is not a set of criteria
developed

by the

scientific observer but the rules built into
the ways
in which the given culture understands and
bestows

wealth.

In some cultures the man with much money in
the bank will

not be considered as wealthy as the owner of large
tracts
of land.
Some cultures may not even make distinctions

based on wealth.

The conclusion which U'inch and others

correctly draw from this is that the study of a culture,
unlike the study of atoms, cannot begin with definitions
imposed from the outside.

Human action is constituted by

the set of rules we learn as social beings.

The study

of a society must therefore begin from the inside.

It

must begin with an examination of the ways in which
the language of a given culture structures its world.
I

will say more about what this means and how it is done

later in the chapter.
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From the perspective of Winch
if we are goin^ to
understand political participation

in a culture, ve .ust

begin by looking at the culture's
understanding of politics,
of participation, and of other
related concepts, perhaps
even the culture's view of man.
Such a conceptual
study

be able to find the ways in
which wealth, as understood
in that society, constitutes
reasons for and opens up
avenues to political participation.
But we accomplish
this task only by getting at the
n>ay

common meanings which

make communication and behavior
possible in the culture.
The behavior of particpation is not
something which exists
apart from the concept of political
participation, with
its rich ties to many other concepts.
If the essence of social study is
the pursuit of a

society's basic world view as embodied in
its language,
the generalizations at which we arrive
are not law-like.

When we establish a tie between v.ealth
and participation,
we point to an institutional and linguistic
connection.
Perhaps stewardship is closely connected
conceptually with
wealth and so political responsibility has come
to bo
part

of what it means to be a wealthy man.

Certain reasons for

political participation will be culturally acceptable
and
comprehensible. This does not mean that members of the
culture would give formal definitions of the concepts
in these terms, only that they in fact use the terms in
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these ways.

The actual use of lan^ua^c in
life is always
far richer than forn^al definitions
suggest and this nust
always be so. Kor are actors in the
culture usually aware
of all the rich associations which
^^row up around the
concepts of their lan^^ua,;e. I am only
suf,,;esti„g that a

Vinchian would

ar^rue that

the connections could be made

clear and comprehensible to a member
of the culture and
that in ideal circur.s t ancos this would
be one measure of
the adequacy of his analysis.

When we say that wealth constitutes a reason
for the
action of participation in our hypothetical
culture, the

reasoh is in some sense a cause of the action, but
there
are important differences from normal natural
science
causality.

There is

a

conceptual connection between the

cause (wealth) and the effect (participation) and so
we
do not have strict llumean causality, where cause and

effect are completely separable entities.

Ue are really

oxplainin;? action throufjh reference to reasons which

would be appropriate to and comprehensible by members of
the culture.

The generalizations may bo causal in the extended
sense of the word, but they are not law-like.

This is

one of the most important consequences of the view being-

developed here.

This approach to a culture will end up

layinf^ out that culture's own rcf^ularit ios

— how

it fits

its world tofrether.

We may find a whole series of
lin^;-

uistic-institutional cormectioiis between land
and political
particpation. Built into those are a set of
rules which

help to constitute the behavior of men in
the culture.
Included in the notion of a rule, however, is

the possi-

bility of changing or breaking the rule.

Especially as a

culture becomes clear about the rules it implicitly
follows, possibilities of change are even more
fully
open.

A culture's whole understanding of the nature of

wealth or participation may change and with it many
related concepts and institutions must change.

And even

if a culture wants to live by its given rules, new mar-

ginal instnaces of the concept will come up and it will
have to decide whether to include these,

A culture whose

paradigm instance of wealth has always been grazing land
will have to decide whether to include wheat acreage.

And we cannot in principle predict ahead of time what
their decisions will be because to predict the evolution
of a concept is in effect to clarify it for them.

As

Winch points out, this is analogous to predicting a poem;
to predict it we would have to write it.

Thus wliatever

generalizations we attain must derive from an interior

understanding of the culture and to attribute law-like
status to them is to misconstrue their real nature.

Even whore the connection between underlying factors
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and olfects seen.s to have no
underlying cultural con.ponent.
the connection still exists in
and can only be understood
in terms of a conceptual-social
matrix. Thus it n.ay
'

be

possible to establish connections
between genetic determinants and violent behavior. But
what will constitute
"violent behavior" varies with the
culture and so an
understanding of the culture's own view
of man and society
as built into its concepts and
practices remains crucial.

Even in those cases where a

rnorc

traditional sort of

social science analysis seems feasible,
we cannot be content,
as would a natural scientist, with
establishing mere temporal priorities. Genetic factors may
be probabilistically
related to murder, but murder as a concept
and social
practice is closely tied to other concepts
and practices
x^hich are subject to change.
The social scientist
who

does not make society aware of this tragically
misleads.

Treating human action

lil.e

the movement of electrons, he

may unduly constrict possibilities for social
change.

Nothing that

I

have said denies that we can and do

establish generalizations about
in time.

a

culture at a given point

We may find tliat certain groups are always

regarded by others in

a

specific way and that consequently

they are denied important privileges.

We also make pro-

dictions on the basis of these generalizations.

Thus

generalizations about the relationship of racial prejudice
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to economic affluence may bo correct,
but when we view
them as laws we forget that the
relationships may change,
especially as changinft- instances of the
"inferior" group

occurs.

Secondly and more importantly we forget
that this
generalization is tied to and gets its meaning

from a whole

set of cultural meanings about wealth
and personal worth.
By failing to put the regularity in the
larger context
of cultural meanings we deprive people of
a chance to

become fully aware of its implicit connection
to many
facets of our cultural life. The possibility that
social
change can be effected through the actions of
self-conscious

moral agents is thus blunted.

\vTien

the possibility of

expanded consciousness is lessened, whatever social
change

occurring is more likely to be the result of manipulation
or other forms of behavior control.

To conclude this discussion of an internal conceptual

approach to social science I want to distinguish it briefly
from contemporary social science's concern with "political

culture."

Then

I

will provide an indirect defense of this

approach by showing that it gives us a way around some of
the difficulties presented by the conventional free will

debates.

I

ajn

not claiming

tliat

these questions are solved

or that a final proof of a social view has been developed,

only that plausible reasons can be found for adopting
this approach.

77

Even positivist social scientists
have for so.ne tin.c
been aware that the study of
human behavior would have
to
involve son.e consideration of the
concepts of the actors,
but their ideas differ widely
fro. Winch's. Recent attempts
to explain the stability of
certain V/estern
derr.ocracios

have placed great

ez^.phasis on the

political culture.

Political culture is defined as the
co^^nitive, affective,
and evaluative orientations of
individual
actors toward

the political objects of the system. ^

To many behav-

iorists this seems an ideal way to embody
the ideas of
people in their models of society. The
social scientist
can objectively ascertain what groups and
people know
and what their feelings and attitudes are,
and this data
can then be used as evidence to construct
causal
laws.

These categories suggest that reason and emotion
are
fully distinct and separable entities and that
action is
fully separable from the ideas the actors have about it.
I have commented on some of the problems in making
such

assumptions.

A second limitation of this approach lies

in the fact that one is getting at

a

set of individual

attitudes without layin.- out the set of cultural meanings
and connections which give these attitudes their full
9

(Jabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civj c Culture ,
Little, Drown, and Co., 1963"), Ch. 1,

(Boston:
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sienificance and which are the basis of
communication within
the culture by people who disafrree
with each other.
An

analo/Ty here will help n,ako my point
more clear.

Let

suppose we were to study the ^ame of
chess with
the aim of explaining the behavior of
the participants.
We might ask each participant how he
played the game and
how his strategy differed from his
opponent's.
One player
might say that he believed in an aggressive
style
ur,

of play;

another might declare that he tried to confuse
his opponent.
On the basis of such research we might draw
some conclusions
about victory in chess.
Yet a question of transcendent importance remains:
do we really understand what the game of chess is
all about.
We cannot understand victory or aggressive play
until we

understand the meaning of a move in chess.

And we don't

understand that until we know the rules shared by both
opponents, rules which make the game of chess what it is.
When the players are asked about the game and why they

often win or lose they will discuss their differences

from their opponents, but they are not discussing the
shared rules which make meaningful and possible the game
they both play.

These shared rules are implicit in and

make possible the practices of the game and their dis-

cussion of it.
Let us move from this analogy to the question of
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understanding^ human behavior.

The argument now becomes

that human action can bo understood
only in terms of the
shared meanings which constitute a
culture. Consider
the example of voting;.
Voting is an action which takes
on its meaning because of a set of
basic distinctions

present in a culture.
of pulling a

lever.

It is not the mere physical act

It means something because of such

distinctions as that between free and coerced
behavior,
distinctions which are built into our language and

practices and give meaning to such actions as voting.
There is in other words a set of intersub jective
meanings

which are present in the practices of a society and
give
them meaning.
These are in a sense assumptions built
into the total way we conceive the world and because they
are so basic and underlie all the communication of a

culture they do not come through in any set of answers to

questionaires about individual opinions on topics of
current interest.
But finding the central lin^i-uistic distinctions in

order to understand the important practices of a society
is a problematic process.

As Taylor points out, its

difficulties are equal and analogous to those of fei'reting
The discussion of this point and the voting example
draws on Charles Taylor's excellent article, "Interpretation and the Sciences of Man," Keview of Metii|jiiysic3
25 (1971).
,
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out the syi^jbolic moaning of a Biblical
text.

always

There is

for legitiruate dispute in the
interpretation
of texts, though I would not agree
with the implication
which sometimes creeps into Taylor's essay
that the proce ss
is totally relativist and subjective.
Some interpretation s
clearly stand outside the pale of the
plausible.
roon,

We must therefore be engaged in the
process of

ferreting out the root metaphors of a culture,
and to do
this we must understnad the culture from within.
Ve

can't

begin by imposing our concept from without but
must

intuitively insert ourselves into the culture.
From the behavioral perspective there are serious

problems with this approach.

In the first place once we

argue that the basic conceptual distinctions a society

makes are inextricably bound up with or constitute the

behavior of the society, we can no longer aim for causal
generalizations about societies.

Actions can be understood

only within the context of individual cultures and practices cannot be predicted.

Two "similar" actions or

remarks in different cultures are not necessarily the
same.

Thus these events cannot be used to formulate

cross-cultural causal generalizations.

Consider Alasdair

Maclntyre's discussion of the problems faced by Almond
and Verba:
•

•

.Almond and Verba argue that Italians
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are less committed to .
.the actions of
their 6Toverninent than are Gernans
or Enrlishnien, oflerlnf^ as evidence
the fact that 'the
Italian respondents as compared to
the En^^lish
and German respondents to their
survey, placed
such actions very low on a list of
which they had been asked to cive a itonis to
order in ternn of the an^ount of priderank
they
took
them.
At no point do Almond and
Verba pause to ask whether the concept
of pride is the same in the three
different
national cultures, that is, to ask whether
the different respondents had after all
asked the same question. J3ut in fact thebeen
concept of pride. . .in Italy is not the
same as that pride in England. The notion
of takinf- pride in Italian culture is
still
inexorably linked.
.to the notion of honor.
What one takes pride in is A,rhat touches
on
one's honor.
If asked to list the subjects
which touched their honor, most Italians
would spontaneously place the chastity of
their immediate female relatives high on
the list a connection that it would occur
to very few Enffliahmen to raalce.
These notions
of pride and honor partially specify and are
partially specified by a notion of the family
itself importantly, if imperfectly, embodied
in the actualities of Italian family life.H
.

m

.

—

The above quotation clearly illustrates the close

interweaving of language, thought, culture and practices
and the problems thus created for a simple causal approach.

These problems are closely tied to the impossibility of a

predictivist model of social science, as discussed above.
P^rom this

anti-behavioral perspective the social

Alasdair Maclntyre, "Is a Science of Comparative
Politics Possible?," ±n Maclntyre, Against the Self images of the Age pp. 262-263.
,
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scientist Should essentially
.e en.a.ed in the
process of
providing a portrait of a

culture-what is its basic
con-

ception Of itself as expressed
in its institutions
and in
the assumptions embodied
within its language.
This
task

Is Closely allied with
that of the En.-lish ordinary

language philosophers, of who™
the late John Austin is
perhaps the »ost outstanding,
example
Such a social
science raises the self-awareness
of a culture, .a.es us
aware of .any of our implicit
rules and thus brings about
the possibility of change.
Thus it can hardly
be value

free.

And in fact the social
scientist's view of hu,„an
nature will have a bearine on
his interpretation
of a

culture, a point Taylor has
properly stressed.

addition to a retreat

fron,

Thus in

causality this perspective

also rejects the possibility of
the positivisfs idolized
"neutral observer." Different
interpretations of a given
society n,ay in effect involve a
paradigm dispute. Evidence
will be relevant, but not in the
simple knock-down sense
assumed by an earlier positivism.
In conclusion we have discussed a
philosophical

position which rejects the possibility of
law-like generalizations. A major reason for a science
of comparative
'^John Austin,

ff?S?'l970r"*

"A Plea for Excuses," Philosop hical
(London:
Oxford'uni vcrsity
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politics has always been the notion
that comparison is
the social scientist's replacement
for experiment in the
natural sciences. Comparison yields
law-like generalizations. The argument made by the
critics is
that the

so-called laws established by comparative
politics have
resulted from reading into all cultures
certain
aspects

present only in our own, and ones subject to
change even
in our own. Thus the view of man as
autonomous bargainer
has been an important source of meaning in
our
culture,

and social scientists have universalized this
notion
by suggesting that interest articulation and
interest

aggregation are what politics is all about.

But these

very concepts would mean nothing to a society which had
no concept of bargaining.

The laws based on the use of

such concepts can only be literal nonsense.
On the basis of these arguments 1 do not want to

suggest that there is no basis for comparative politics.
I

merely want to redefine the nature of the field.

The

real task of the discipline is to help us become aware
of the meaning of our own culture by broadening our

awareness of other cultures.

Nor does it follow from the

above arguments that we must accept all cultural patterns
as being equally fulfilling.

Man is a social being and

his behavior must be understood from the inside first,
by reference to the basic meanings built into his culture.
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But once we understand our own and other
cultures we are
in a better position to elaborate an
ideal of man and to
consider the ways in which various culturc'il
patterns
frustrate or enhance the emergence of various
facets of
that ideal.

My reraainine task in this chapter is to discuss
briefly one important philosophical implication of

this

view of man.

The effort to view human behavior in causal,

law-like terms has become connected with a philosophical

debate which goes back at least as far as Auir^ustine.

If

human behavior is caused, in what sense if any can we
speak of men as free agents, deliberating beings who make

choices in terms of their goals and purposes?

Advocates

of causal laws have responded to this critical question

with two major arguments.

To say that human behavior

is caused is only to assert that certain factors invar-

iably precede the occurrence of particular actions.

Causality in this sense is not the same thing as compulsion,
The preceding factors do not compel action.

Advocates of

a causal approach also argue that an unwillingness to
s tudy

man in this way leaves us with a view of human

a ction as totcilly random or disorderly.

V/e

cannot give

any sense to the regularities and coherences which we

recognize as a part of human life

— and

which w© need if

we are to bo held responsible for the consequences of our

85

own actions.

These arguments have led in turn to
long discussions
about the relationship of causality
and con^pulsion
and

about the concept of moral responsibility.

It has been

observed that these traditional arguments
about causality
and the freedon, of the will appeared
to be getting no
where.
When this is the case it is often
because
the

debate has not been stated in proper terms
and needs to
be restructured.
It seems to be that such advocates
of
ordinary language as Winch and Austin have in
effect

done just that.

Their vehicle for this achievement has

been the exaiijination of the concept of human
action which
wo have been discussing in this chapter.
The view of human action developed here leads us
to regard major,

unpredictable.

large social change as inherently

The social scientist may show how certain

root metaphors and conceptual distinctions have fitted

Into the institutional development of the culture.

These

concepts do not exist in a vacuum and thus do not change
in entirely random ways.

The social scientist may foresee

problems for a society in its self-interpretation,

Taylor,

for instance, sugi-:ests that the kind of meanings implicitly

present in our Protestant, work-ethic culture may have
gone sour for us.

This kind of culture may once have

implicitly meant community to us, but it can no longer
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carry that meaning because its actual
development haas
altered us and our relationship to each
other and

o,
)ur

world,

A productive, work-oriented barpaininc
culti
;ure
may have once supplied the humanly necessary
pattern of

embodied in the notion of community, but
once built
such a culture comes to lose this meanin^^.
There is nothing
now to accomplish, no task of building a new
society which
unites men in rebellion against the old. The
social
njeaninrr

scientist can perhaps foresee these problems, or more

accurately he can see the meaning of practices changing;
but he cannot predict the emergence of new concepts
and

practices which will replace man as bargainer with new

needed meanings and give us a new sense of identity and
community.

If we had these new concepts and practices,

in a sense we would already be in the future.

But this does not mean that human behavior is

random.

Behavior is related to language, and language

is a social product.

The behavior of any individual will

show orderliness and coherence over time because we are all

implicated in conceptual systems which none of us as single,
isolated beings creates, and which cannot change immediately.

But this view also suggests that we are free in

the sense that we contribute to the development of this

common language,

l/e

can develop the sort of cultural

self-awareness which alia

3

us to participate in the process
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of chnnginf: the cultural „eb i„
which all
and v/hich men create.

The social critic can be

enf^a^^^d in a

„,e„

implicated

dialogue with

his culture v.hich creates new meanings
and so new patterns
of action.
I xvould ar;.iue that today within
certain parts
of our culture the meaning of the
concept work is being
subtly chanfjed as the concept becomes tied
to ideals of
human fulfillment no longer related to the
denial
of

self-aspirations for the sake of later egoistic
rewards.
The concept is freeing itself from certain
acquisitive
features.

With this will inevitably go many other cul-

tural changes.

Our freedom lies in effect in our ability

to be social critics, to become aware of our culture
and
to participate in the ongoing cultural dialogue.

But

this freedom is not adequately characterized by the imago

of the individual, isolated atom striking out randomly,
"at will."

One reason the old free will debate has

generated such problems is its close connection to this
atomistic view of freedom, a view which seems to ec.uato

freedom with whim.

But real human freedom lies in the

ability to make changes in meanings and practices which
are comprehensible to a culture or subculture.

Free acts

are part of cultural change and development.

This

viexv

oJ'

the nature of freedom is highly con-

gruent with the social view of man we have been elabor-
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atin^ in this chapter.
an exuniinatiun of the

ordinary discourse.
is free sinipli ci t er

It is furthermore,
Avay

in A.hich we use Ireodom in

For we do not say
,

congruent with

tliat

an individual

but that he is free of an obstacle

to achieve certain ends."''^

Freedom is always related

to some context of sociall comprehensible
ends.

•"^Gerald C. MacCalluin, Jr., "Nef^ative and Positive
Freedom," in Anthony Do Crespi/7ny and Alan Wertheimer,
Contemporary i^olitical T heo r;^.
>
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A P T E R

V

HUMAN NATURE AND MORAL CONCEPTS
We have already seen that different views of
human

nature are comiected v/ith different approaches to
the
moral evaluation of societies. Atomistic views of
human
nature are connected with causal, "scientific" approaches
to the study of man.

These approaches seem to encourage,

though perhaps not entail, a certain attitude toward the

moral evaluation of societies and moral discourse as a
whole.

The contemporary political scientist believes he

should strive to discover the laws governing the evolution
of society.

In this process he is concerned with the

actual patterns of social evolution, not with prescribing
what ought to be.

He believes that in so far as his

comiaitnients to a particular moral point of view influence

his concepts and research, his ability to derive social
Isms will bo lessened.

If he cones to believe that a

given form of social organization is morally desirable,
he may become tainted with a strong psychological tendency
to believe that it will inevitably come to pass.

This

belief may affect his capacity to derive causal laws in
an objective manner.

Mainstream political scientists
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ortoii accuse

Marxism of this failing.

They argue that

one reason why Marxists believe the
course of history

will inevitably produce a classless society,
despit.
great historical "evidonce" to the contrary,
is

the:
>ir

strong moral commitment to this outcome, a
commitment
which blurs their capacity to read the evidence.
The conception of moral discourse held by
mainstream
political scientists is closely related to their view
of
how science must proceed. W© have already alluded
briefly
to this connection in the case of Dahl.

He along with

most mainstream political scientists accepts noncogni-

tivism in ethics, the view that moral positions cannot be

rationally defended and are mere expressions of preference.
The genesis of this position is interesting because
it reflects Hobbesian assumptions about reason and about

language.

The logical positivists of the thirties, who

first put this position in modern philosophical garb,

declared that to bo meaningful a proposition must admit
of one or a few procedures which could verify it.

This

verif lability criterion grew out of their basic assumption
that language reflects

tlie

world out there,

^

Since moral

^Discussion and critiques of this view may be found in
Philosophic a 1 Analysis (London: Oxford
Univeriiity Press, 1956) and in Hannah Pitkin, V/ittfrens tein
and J ustice
(Berkeley: University of California Press,
J.

0, Urrason,
,

19727".

,
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propositions do not seem to

adn,it of a simple set of

observations which vould verify
they were meaningless.

then,,

positivists asserted

Later the position was modified

to 3U/-gest that they were mere expressions
of preference

or efforts to get one to abide by one's
preference:
like X, do so as v/ell.

I

The view of human discourse as

a tool of our private interests slips in here.

From this point of view one moral judf^ment is rationally

speaking just as acceptable as anooher.

Opposed groups in

society are always defending their position in terms of
the public interest or other morally-laden claims.

But

the fact that radically different policies arc defended
in moral terms proves that these terms are mere expressions

of personal preference.

And because moral propositions are

merely emotive the social scientist has no business defending a moral view toward any society he studies or
letting moral judgments affect his work.

Nor will his

analysis of society necessarily entail any moral conclusion.

"Facts" and "values" are separate.

Research

is to be "value neutral."

Critique of Moral Stance of Mainstream Political Science

Despite its pretensions of value neutrality, con2

Tlie developr.ient of noncognit d viom in ethics is analyzed in W, D. Hudson, Mo dern Moral Philosophy (Garden
City:
Anchor Books, 1970).
,
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teuiporary poJitical science do«s
carry obvious ethical

implications.

There is already a lar^e literature
on
various aspects of the connection between
is and

ou^^ht in

modern political science and so I shall

n,ake

only a few

general rentarks.
It ±B not surprisinfT that there is

v.

strong tendency

in pluralist literature to define the
good society in term s

which bear a striking resorablance to
contoniporary American
society,
..ike Hobbcs, Robert Dahl cannot fully
eschew

the use of moral terms,

and when he uses words of noral

prair.e these are often reserved for American
democracy.

A political system in which a wide range of desires
is
expressed is favored because all desires ar>e regarded
as ethically equal and the social construction of
desires
is not understood.

People simply have wants and in a

formally open society lacking extreme inequalities these
wants will surface.

Thus a system with many interest'

groupa and open access to decision makers is regarded as
the good society.

The same view of man which sustains

a particular conception of value neutral science also

paradoxically sanctions pluralism as the good society.
Secondly, a pluralist society is likely to be espe-

cially congenial to modern political scientists because
it is a society to which their whole methodology seems

especially applicable.

There are clear inputs into the
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oysiem in the form of interest group
demands and outputs
in the form of policies. This allows
one to explain outputs through a vector sum analysis of the
inputs. This
system squares perfectly with the nature of
science.
It

is as though modern social science wore a
clear copy of
the Nov/tonip,n universe.

Lastly, pluralists show a tendency to assume
that

American society represents some sort of highest
resting
point in world history. They see it as the
culmination
of forces present in various stages around the world.
Thir.

tendency is most apparent in the development liter-

ature.

Devolopmont theorists look for prerequisites of

pluralist democracy and they find these in industrialization, urbanization, literacy.

These underlying factors

are considered to be the iujportcmt causal agents in

political development.
Development theorists are doing two things of dubious

validity here.

They are absolutizing the pattern of

development of the United States and

l.'estern

Europe.

Historically in the West the growth of cities and industry
was associated with democracy, and the assumption is that

everywhere else this pattern will hold.

No thought is

given to tho possibility that in societies with a different understanding
sclienjo

ol"

the value of material comforts the

of development as well as tho content of the
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deniocratic ideal might be very different

.

Secondly, a

major r«ason why the experience of the West
exerts such
influence is the causal fraraework within which
development
theoris ts work.

it h.,s been r.aid that development liter-

ature reflects the ethnocentric bias of much work
in

comparative politics.

But one reasoii why this field has

been so ethnocentric is that its philosophical undei-pinninfjs assume the regularity and inevitability of
patterns

with which the investi^yator has become familiar.

a number

of societies went through similar patterns of development

and one therefor© a.sserts he has found a causal pattern.
In the future the same events will produce the same

effects.

Before

v/o

can fully understand the inadequacies of

the moral perspective of contemporary political science,
it is necessary to turn to problems in its noncognitivist

theory of moral discourse.

Many modern philosophers have

become dissatisfied with the pooitivist view that moral
tei^ms arc

mere ©xprest^ions of preference.

The real

grammar of moral terms, as revealed by a close study of

ordinary diacourse, suggests that these terms are much
moi'e

complex

tlian

attempts to view them in emotive

terras

imply,

Charles Tayloi* and Kurt Daier have led the attack
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on the po3itivic;t theory or moral
discourse.^

I will arguo

first that their work provides a sound
description of
moral discourse in our culture. Then I will
show

that their

view of moral

terras is not

ethnocentric but rather is an

outgroi/th of certain features necessary to moral
dis-

course as such.
I

In the process of developing- these claims

will correct some of the extreme relativism implicit
in

the conclusions drawn by Winch from his social view of

human nature.

If there are formal criteria for moral

discourse there are then standards by which we may judge
some practices within a society to bo inconsistent with

its own basic moral posture.

Lastly, I will

ar/^-ue

that

we can provide some reasons for supporting a concept of

person which allows us not only to criticize particular
practices within a society but also the opportunities for
personal development within a society.

These allow us

not only to question the consistency of social practices
but also to wei(;h societies as a ivhole.

\!q

can {jivc some

content to the formal requirements of moral discourse.

Winch has failed to grasp Rousseau »s insight that a social
view of man need not imply acceptance of all practices
"^Kurt Baier, The Moral P oint o_f View, (New York:
Random House, 19^5) aiJd Charles Taylor, "Neutrality in
Political Science," in Peter Laslett and W. G, Runciman,
Philosopl ty;, P o 1 i t j c s and Society ^x'd series,
eds
(Oxford:
Uasil iJlackwcll, lyb?).
. ,

.

,

,
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within a society nor of all societies.
In attacking the positivists Taylor
and Baier deny
that the political scientist can plausibly
claim to be

merely drnwinc out causal laws which explain
and describe
reality.
Our interpretation and analysis of reality
inevitably carries with it ethical implicacations
,

and the

connection is not merely psycholof;ical but lo^rical.

In

maintaining that a given theory in the social sciences

necessarily carries with it ethical implications, Taylor
also implies that there are rational criteria relevant
to ethical judgiaenta.

lie

and Baior defend such a con-

tention through a close look at the way in which we use
ethical terns in ordinary language,

a

proper cipproach for

those who see language and reality as inextricably

connected.

The centi^al contention here is that the logical
grauitnar
fi'oiii

of statoments about likes and wants is different

that of statements of good.

We see this point when

we look at the different ways in which we talk when wo

use these concepts.

If I say that I like x, questions

about why are only appi'opriate in the sense that

specify what it is about x that
its taste.

V.'e

I like,

I

may

as for instance

might then go on to say we liked its

sweet taste, but we would find it odd if someone kept

pressing us at this point as to why we liked the sweet
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taste.

But if I

..ay

that a policy or event is

,,ood,

I am

liornially

expected to bo able to ^ive reasons,
and the
reasons must be of a certain kind.
Statements

about good

must,

la, meet certain roquirei-ient a

.thr.t

arbitrary expressions of preference.
Docialized medicine is

c:ood

.

They are not

If j say that

and when asked why can only

repeat that it is good I will not be understood
as engaging
in proper use of the term. Taylor summarizes
this point
as f ollo\/s

:

A judgment that I like something doesn't
need grounds. That is, the absence of
grounds doej.n't undermine the claim "I
like X"
.But unless we adduce reasons
.
for it (and moreover reasons of a certain
kind as we shall see below) v/o cannot show
that our claim that x is good says more
than "I like x,"^
,

The reasons ur.cd to delend something as good must
take a certain form.

If I say that the murder of x is

good because x is a Vietcong sympathizer, I must be willing
to ray that J .-should bo killed if I shared the same

characteristics which made the sympathizer evil.

Other-

wise I would not be understood as making a moral argument.
In addition the principle must be one which can be

applied to everyone; it must, that is, bo universalizable
Lastly, the reasons used to defend a moral judgment must
92j. cit

.

,

Taylor, p. 30,
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be ones which pertain to the purposes,
needo, and interests
of human bein,?s.
Or as Baier put this, sowethinf: we
defend
as moral must be for the good of all alike.
If vo are not

willin- to defend

u

position in these terms our hearers

will suspect that ue are merely expressing- our
personal
likes and dislikes. Te^ylor makes this kind of
ar^juinent
in the case of an individual who declares that
socialized
raedicine is bad:

But supposin^r he v/as willing to give grounds
for his position
.
., saying? . . ."Too many
people would be dressed in v/hite"? V.e would
reraain in doubt as to how to take his opposition,
or we would be led to ask of his
opposition to the increase of doctors, say,
whether he was inalcing a jud^;inent concerning
good and bad or sianply oxpressinj^ a dislike.
And we v^ould decide this question by looking
at the grounds he adduced for this position.
And if he clairaed to have nothing to say,
his po.-ition would be unintelligible in
exactly the same way as if bo had decided
to remain silent at the outset and leave
his original statement unsupported.
.

i'

An analysis of ordinary discourse does then seem to

provide sound grounds for

Boxno

connection between our

factual view of the world and our evaluation of it.

For

Taylor horo is not constructing his own definition of
good.

He is reminding us of the rules we tacitly follow

when we use the concept.

This is what he is doing when

he points out the distinctions we always make in questions
-^

Ibid.

,

p.

53.
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we ask when a man says ho likes x versus
the questions
which are approprinte when one says x is
c'ooci.
Taylor
appeals to ordinary discourse in an effort to
show that
we do have fornal rational criteria for
the use of moral
judgnionts and that wo are thus not merely
expressin/T

preferences
On the basis of the arguraents which have been made

thus far it

iniftht

soem that the social scientist is in a

position to apply moral criteria to ongoing societies.
Yet throughout this work I have been defending the plaus-

ibiJity of a social viou of

iflan,

a major contention of

which is that societies must be understood in

teri:js

of

their own language systems, in other words internally.
The argument above seems to try to move us in the dii^ection of applying moral standards cross-culturally.

V,'e

seem now to be saying that outsiders can judge tho moral

adequacy of a society's practices, perhaps even according
to standards not accepted by

tlic

participants themselves.

At this point I will explore some differences among

those

v/ho

take a social view of man,

Peter Winch has in

fact argued that moral criteria are relative to a society

and that outsiders may not pass judgment,

Taylor, JJaier,

and Nielsen would reply that they are not constructing

ethnocentric moral criteria and

tliat

they are only showing

the criteria of moral discourse which must prevail for
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boins-s to bo social and n,oral.

If we can accept their

arguments we will be able to .ay that
such criteria as
meeting: human interests needs and
purposes are applicable
to all societies.
TUe task will then be to ^;ive
some
content to that phrase "human interests,
needs and purposes," and I will attempt to explain
and provide some
defense for the content ^iven it by Rousseau.
I will want
to make it more than a formal notion,
so^^iothing by which
wo can move beyond questions of cultural
inconsistencies.
It is necessary first to distinguish
V/inch's con-

ception of cultural relativism from the
noncognitivist
position held by the logical positivists. In an

article

on human nature v;inch attacks the position of
those

ethical philosophers who try to tie moral terminology
to certain sorts of hunsan needs, ^

Though he is attacking

Alasdair Maclntyre, his arguments would apply equally to
Charles Taylor or Kurt Baier.

¥inch arguos that because

human nature is constituted by society the nature of

morality will depend upon the conception of human nature
built into the culture.

Winch remarks:

"VAiat we

can

ascribe to human nature does not determine what we can
and what we cannot make sense of; rather what we can and

^Peter »/inch, "Human Nature," in Royal Institute of
Philosophy, Tiie ]^ropcr Study (Now York; NacxMillan, I97I).
«
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what

v;e

caiinot inake sense of

ascribe to hur.an nature.
that the concept of

doterminos what we can

It is precisely for this
reason

nature is not the concept of

hian.an

something: fixed and G:iven;

."'^
.

.

In other words moral codes and the
needs on which

thoy are based must bo explained in terms
of the ^iven
culture. Even the connection of morality to
human

needs

depends on the culture, and presumably one could
find
cultures in which there is a moral discourse not

tied in

any way to human needs.

Moral evaluation may be char-

acterized as merely a sot of standards which are involved
in various institutionalized practices.

Winch thus denies that we can establish cross-cultural moral grammar.

I\irthermore he denies that we can

question if a particular practice in a society is in-

consistent or irrational.

We who are outsiders must begin

with the assumption that there is a logic, an internal
lofiic,

to their practices.

Criteria of logic are not

God-given; thoy are themselves part of a culture.

Winch

has pushed a social view of man as far as it can be pushed,
7

0

Ibid

,

p.

10.

Peter Wxnch, The Idea of

Relfiti on to

Pl ii

losopliy

Paul, 19587, p. 100,

,

(London:

Social Science ana its
Routledgo and Kegan
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The beginning of an answer to his position must
show that
there is a coiumon logic to moral discourse and
tliat

the

existence of such a logic is in fact one necessary
aspect
of man's social nature. These forr-al requirements
of

moral discourse do allow us to raise legitimately
questions
of consistency within a culture.
Once this is established
we can move on to discuss the possibility of giving

specific content to these formal standards and so of

judging whole societies.
The issues hero become clearer when we recognize that

Winch is not taking a noncognitivist theory of ethics.
Ho would probably admit that the work of Taylor and Uaier
is a good analysis of ethical discourse in Anglo -American

culture,

I suspect,

though, he would side with Paul

Taylor in the assertion that Daier and Charles Taylor
have inappropriately universalized certain aspects of

modern

Vi'esterr.

liberal morality:

Thoy have been guilty

of an ethnocentric fallacy in attributing to all moral

discourse features found only in the moral discourse of
the modern

\v'est.

9

The argument is that certain egali-

tarian feiitures supposedly common to moral discourse

everywhere are violated by some institutions and those
^Paul Taylor, "The Ethnocentric Fallacy," in The
Monist Vol. 47, (1963), pp. 5^33-534.
,
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"violations" have been defended in a

only bo conciderod moral.

langiia^;c

which can

Paul Taylor also, along lines

similar to the Winch attack, su^jeests that the

Jiaier

denial of self-interest as the basis of any possible

morality is clearly ethnocentric and that one could
easily
conceive of egoistic ethical systems.
Kai Nielsen has advanced arguments on two levels

against this position.

''^

He first remarks that a number

of seemingly "immoral" institutions are in fact embraced

within the terms of moral discourse as set forth by Baier
and Taylor.

The storm trooper who advocates the death

of Jews is still making a moral argument (for ho says he

would accept death if he had the qualities he attributes
to Jews.)

His argument becomes understandable as a moral

position only if he is willing to reverse his position
and apply it to himself.

The storm trooper and the modern

liberal differ not over the meaning of moral terms but
over their own factual understanding of various groups
in the population.

Study of some of the most notorious

causes in human history will sustain the kind of argument

Nielsen is making here.

Aristotle's defense of slavery

is a moral defense precisely because it attributes certain
"On Moral Truth," in American Philosophi
32 (1968), pp. 9-25.

^^Kai Nielsen,
S.'3l

Qu-trtevly,

'
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rational deficiencies to the barbarians who
are to be
enslaved and justifies the practice in terms of

all con-

cerned.

An analysis of the Southern defense of slavery

before the Civil ¥ar reveals the

sanie

chttiactoristics

Thus an examination of moral argaiments in different

cultures and periods points to a comraon grammatical

structure present in such arguments.
On a deeper level Nielsen and Taylor argue in effect

that moral discourse must have certain basic critei-ia

given the nature of

ninn

as a social and rational beinf:.

Croos-cultuial similarities in grammatical structure are
not morcly accidental.

The argument is analogous and

related to the contention that language and society
presuppose certain general criteria of rationality.

The

requireroent that moral discourse be a discourse of

principle and not merely self-interest and that moral

reasoning advance considerations pertaining to human needs
is not merely relative to a particular culture because
moi'ality is constructed by i^ational beings who live

in society, and the very existence of society demands
a point of view above self-interest, a moral point of
viev/.

As Nielsen puts it:

Any society needs sotDo device for impartially
adjudicating conflicts of interest. Society
is necessary for humfjin beings, and when
huinrm beings J.ive together, band together in
a society with at least the minimal coop-
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eration thi o implies, they will have
conflicts
of interest
If, when such conflicts
occur
each raon wero to oeek to further
his seJfxnterei,t
lo>ie, there would be the
conllict and chaos in society that kind of
no
reasonable uan could desire. In fact
if men
were to act in this way, it would
not even
be correct to spea]c of them as
livin^r torether
in society.
Thus to live to/-:ether, to further one of the main ends of morality
men
must adopt rulos which override
self-interest
To take the moral point of view of
involves conf orrain;- to such rulos. necessity
but
conform to such rulos is not simply to to
oneself to liberal i.estern morality. Itcommit
is
rather to adopt a point of view that is and
must be implicit in all n.oral reasoning.
.

'

i

^ ^

Thus these characteristics are not infinitely
variable.
They are basic to man as a rational, social
beinfr,

a

point with which Rousseau would fully concur.
Once wo
a rational,

i.;ee

that our very understanding of man as

social

bein^>:

forces us into this view of the

nature of moral discourse, certain conclusions follov/

with respect to the evaluation of existing societies.
It becomes possible for us to point to specific practices

in any society as wron^- or irrational in terms of the

general moral norms built into society as such.
societies wo can

fii;d

In most

examples of groups who are treated

in ways which tacitly controvert the formal principles

of the society.
1 1

Op

.

clt

.

,

We nov/ cannot assume that such treatment

Nielsen, p. 21,
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is moral in ternm of that t.ociety's
view of morality.

Logical consistency is built into morality,
but in most
societies we will find groups who are denied
privileges and
yet held to responsibilitioa which attest
iirplicitly to

their full personhood.

When no morally appropriate reason

is being given for this incon£5istency we arc
proper in

pointing out the moral contradiction involved in
the
practice.
The first part of the argument against Winch's pure

social relativinm thus must be that a social view of man
roust

not end in a denial of the very possibility that

certain aspects of a society might be inconsistent
one another.

V/o

v/ith

must not attempt as empathctic students

to find criteria of logic or rationality after the fact
to justify or explain every social practice.

All societies

are not internall y coherent, rational, and moral in all

respects; and certain generally applicable criteria can
be used to bring out the inconsistencies and irration-

alities in ways which could in principle be understood by

members of the culture.

Thus in Victorian England and

even to a considerable extent in the contemporary United

States one can find instances of citizens who strongly

protest the presence of pornography and call publicly
for

lav/s

to limit its dissemination.

Yet those same

persons can be found enjoying pornography within the
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the confines of their own homes and
passing it to friends.
A social science committed in advance
to find the consistency in such practices might well ir.i
sunders t and
either the individual hypocrisy or the
aore subtle psychological and social problems symptoiaized by
the incon-

•

sistency in these patterns of action.
In addition we cannot always assume that
the stated

reasons for an action are an agent's real reasons.

Some

merabers of a society may feel hostility toward
others they

are ashamed or afraid to admit their real reasons
for.

Thus hostility toward young college students or poor

blacks may bo defended on the grounds of the "subversive"
impact of these groups whereas far different factors

underlie the hostility.

Wo cannot ever get at such

reasons if wo assume from the beginning that stated reasons
for action are always the real reasons,
In raising these questions of consistency we are not

applying external criteria of morality and rationality,
but the criteria of morality and rationality as such.

Views and practices which do not correspond with a society's
conception of reality or which are internally inconsistent
are irrational.

These criteria of rationality are, as

12

For a discusBion of this and related points see
Alasdair Maclntyre, "Rationality and the Explanotion of
Action" and "The Idea of a Social Science" in Maclntyre,
Against the Self-images of the Af^e (New York: Schocken
,

Books, 1971),
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Steven Lukes correctly points out, required
for the existence of lancoiar^e an suchj^ Th±{^ line ol

thinkinf,' is not

inconsistent with the requirement that the study of
a
society besin with the society's ovm understanding
of

itself as expressed in and throu,-h its language.
it

c,ro\fS:i

Rather

out of a more complete understanding of wliat
it

is to be a creature of language and society, for to
begin

with the gratuitous acsunption that everything in a society
is defensible and cottiprehensible in that society's terras
is paradoxically going to lead to misunderstanding of that

society.
At this point in our agruraent it is, however, nec-

essary to point out what we have not established.

The

requirement about for the good of all alike (Baier) or

human interests, needs,
take us too far.

£^nd

purposes (Taylor) does not

When human societies are inconsistent

in their treatment of particular groups, do not treat
in terms

ther.i

their conccpticn of

ol'

hunjioii

needs, we can

call these specific practices into question.

far

x^c

But thus

have given these phrases no specific content ,

All

I have done is suggest a common cross cultural grammar

for moral terms.

Is thei'e any way by which we can choose

between different social conceptions of human needs and
1

3

Steven

l.,u.kcs,

Bryan U'ilson, ed
1970).

.

,

"Somo Problems about Kiitionality, " in
Rationality (Wew York: Harp3r and Row,
,
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purposes?

Porhap<; hero wo will onco again be driven
back

into a more reduced form of cultural relativity
with the
claim that the raeaninc of good of all alike depends

on the

concept of por-on developed In the different societies,
and that such a concept can legitimately vary indefinitely

from society to society.

Can we give content to this

grammatical structure and thus put ourselves in a place
to weigh whole societies against each other or ag£iinst

some ideal?

These questions bring us to the heart of Kousseau's
^flSiiii

Contrac t

^

Rousseau recognized that in entering

society men become fundamentally different beings.

They

give up their original independence and are transformed
into moral beings with a laiowledge of good and evil.

Yet

to Rousseau this was a niixod blessing and the state of

nature with its independence provided a standard by which
to weigh the justifiability of this sacrifice.

Only in

communities where there is a pax'ticular sort of relationship of individuals to the moral and social code is the

sacrifice of this primeval independence justifiable.

In

the remainder of this chapter I will discuss the nature

of the com'munity advocated by Rousseau and some of the

arguments which can be advanced in its behalf,
analysis

v;ill shov./ that

Tliis

the concept of person may not

properly bo given any content we wish and that moral
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notions thus have substantive as well as
Tormal requirements. An ar{;un,ent of this sort is based
upon a recognition and defense of the participant capacity
of
all

human bein(-s and is finally an outfjrowth of
the claim
that hunian beings are ends and not mere objects.

These

considerations provide some grounding for the development
of a cross-cultural moral point of view, a point
of view
implying both grammar and more specific content. Finally
I

will consider the kinds of moral perspective on and

proposals for

chan^'/e

of contemporary society to which a

Rousscauian view of man leads.

The critiques from this

perspective are far deeper than the ones managed by those

political scientists who do advance some critiques of
pluralism from within the perspective of abstract individualism.
Before going into Rousseau's ideas about a satis-

factory notion of moral and communal development,

I

will

briefly sketch a diametrically opposed and historically

very influential view, one which provides a contrast
model which will sharpen our understanding of Rousseau,
Burke and Durkheim both hold a moral developmental

view of man which rejects the Hobbesian assumption that
man can only be a creature of self-interest.

Both believe

that man without a stable set of moral restraints is aimless and self -destructive

.

Man must experience a stable

Ill

moral law over against his inclinations,
because these,
left to themselves, are oo strong and so
numerous that
they can never be fulfilled J

Man can have a satisfying

life only when he experiences over against
himself a nioral

code which places clear licjitationa on his desires.

This

moral code must become a part of one's whole personality
or self -identity .

One can then know the limitations of

the human situation and find acceptcmce of these limits

itself a rewarding oxperiancc as

v;ell as

finding his mod-

erate pleasure all the more rewarding because they are

soon as right and the impulses tov/ard them not unlimited.
If morality is to serve this role in human life it

must be part of a tradition handed down to men.

Hierarch-

ical societies where roles are clearly structured and not
subject to the whims of individuals are ideal in this

respect.

The moral code grows out of and sustains the

structure of society and the great mass of mon merely learn
what is expected of them.

purpose unless

5.,t

Morality cannot achieve its

is experienced an something over against

man, and it will not be so experieaiced unless it is handed

down to men as part of the position they inherit in society.
The relationship of men to the moral law is passive.
For a discussion of Durkheim's view of man see Steven
Lukes, "Alientition and Anomie," in Laslett and Runciman,
op, cit.
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Now it would be very misleading to imply that
Rousseau
foui:d everything' in such a picture or morul
community laugh-

able.

It had ^reat appeal to him,

and indeed his attitude

toward authority remained ambivalent throughout

l;is

life.

Yot the central thrust of his political thinking
demanded
a much more active orientation toward the moral
dimensions

of social life on the part of the average citizen.
In the Social Contract 1

^

i<ousseau recognizes that

tlie

condition of a man's becoming a social being is the sur-

render of the independence of the state of nature.

This

sacrifice is justifiable when it makes possible a higher

kind of freedom, the freedom to partipate in the creation
of the laws by which one's will is limited.

Because wo

are basically social-morcil bc:ings, our highest freedom

and fullest development consists in the full recoguition
of this lact

cuid

then in active participation within our

communities in the creation of the laws by which we will
be governed.

One gives up his individual independence,

and this sacrifice is justified only by receiving the

right to participate in the making of the general will.

Now it is notorious that the concept of the general
will has been variously interpreted, but much of the best
15

Jean- Jciccpies llousseau, "The Social Contract," in
Ci'ocker, od,, Tixo S o x a 1 Contract arid
1 cours e
on tho Orig in of Inecjuali ty (New York:
Washington Square
Press, I9677T
LcL^tcr G,

1)

,

r>

*
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contemporary scholarship has converged on an
interpretation
quite at odds from those who have tried to

write ofr Rousseau

as a precursor of tot ali t arianism . ^

The general will is

the will of the wnole con.nmnity for justice
and the public

interest.

The concepts of community, justice, and the

public interest aro the key concepts for understanding

Rousseau's ideal of the general will.
The concern for justice and the public interest, as

well as Rousseau's understanding of those

terras and

their

importance in individual development becomes clear when
we consider, following Plamenatz

,

^

some of the conditions

necessary for the emergence of the general will.

Individuals

are to speak and vote as individuals rather than as members

of a group.

There will be no special interest groups in

the ideal community.

In this way individuals are encouraged

to think in terms of the needs felt by all citizens as

citizens rather than in terms of specia.1 interests with

which they might bo connected.
px^evail.

General equality must also

To Rousseau this means that individuals must have

economic independence.

He is so concerned about these

conditions because to him the will of all can bo the
See for instance George Kateb, "Aspects of iiousseau's
Political Thought," in Isaac Kiramnick, ed.. Essays in tho
History o^f Politica l T hovight (Englewoud Clilfs: Prentice,

Hall,

1909),

^''john Plamenatz, han and Society
Hill Book Co.), Ch. 10,

,

(Mow York:

McGraw-

Ilk

GonorPl vill

or,ly

vhon it

ir.

concerned with the well

boinfj

of every person as a person rather than
as a plumber,

businessman, etc.

Great economic inequality prevents the

development of svch general concern; in other
words it
prevents full moral and coriiinunal development. In
the

ideal conmiunity men will achieve full moral freedom:

they

will freely identify with and work to promote the
needs of
persons as persons. Within a truly participr.nt community
of this sort the voice of the majority is likely to

express correctly the general will; but it is important
to seo that iiousseau la not affirming? the universal

wisdom of majority rule and full participation for all
social contexts.

This point will be important when wo

consider a Rousseauian perspective on contemporary American society.

Rousseau recognizes that man's identity is in large
measure created by tho sort of society in which he lives.
He is
T/ill

them.

cilso

clearly aware that most men in existing societies

feci no need to participate in tho decisions affecting

Perhaps the most baoic point to understand about

Rousseau is that ho is not a need thcoi'ist because

lie

understands so deeply the social construction of needs.
The need theorist believes that an ideal of community
be grounded on those needs displayed by individuals in

society.

He f^xilo to seo

tJiat

those

ax^e

in part the

uiay
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product or history:

the slave .ay olten show
no "behavioral .aerostation- or a need
for rreedo.jS

^^^^^^^^

provides an inadequate foundation
to ground an ideal of
co.n.unity upon--it is a very loose
and shifting foundation.
Housseau founds his vision of the
couu.unity
on an ideal of

the autonomous person.

lie

reco^nizco that his political

theory is Utopian in the sense that
it is not based upon
the experience of actual conm.unitles
nor upon actual
relt need., but he would ar^ue that
any political theory
which lacks a Utopian dimension must be
in lar^e measure
an apoloii-y for the established order.
Rousseau
wants to

broaden self-av.aroness and open up wholly
new possibilities
of development.
It is his

b.'isic

assumption that the complete devel-

opment of what it n<eans to bo a moral and
social person
implies a commitment to a participant view of
human nature
and thus the participant community. I do not
believe
that

knock-down arcuments can be advanced to sustain this
view,
but there are considerations which can be advanced
in its

behalf.
The strongest rrgument for his position lies in the

contention that to be a fully developed person includes
1

For a discussion of this subject see V/illiam Connolly,
"Comment on Bay," Inquiry Vol. l^j
(1971), pp. 237-243,
.

,
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not only the ability to obey moral
rules but also the
capacity to become reflective about
the rules themselves.
Any social view of man recognizes
that man
is a rule

following being; and to be rule following
is different
from being moved by laws of nature.
Part of the notion
of follovvring a rule is the possibility
of violating
or

changing the rule.

But for this possibility to be fully

present, people must become aware of the rules
they follow.
The existence of rules requires, as Winch
correctly

points out, the presence of authority in the
community.

A rule implies a right and a wrong way of doing
something
and thus established authority which provides a means
of determining what constitutes the right and the wrong
way.

The existence of miles depends upon the existence

of community, as our discussion of a private lang-uage

made clear.

But none of this implies that authority

must be something over the community.

Authority can re-

side in the community as a whole, and when men participate
in the creation Of the most important rules, which deter-

mine the whole tenor of their lives, they can become more

reflectively aware of the rules.

Through the creation

of rules men must become aware of their existence.

Par-

ticipation is a way by which one develops the capacity
for reflection about the moral law and thus the ability
to modify it critically.

Some important rules are mere
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habit.

Those habits could be but are not
brou,,ht to lor.al
awareness. It becomes more completely
accurate in this
situation to say that men are following
rules because

the possibility o± choice is necessarily
present.

Unthinking or habitual obedience to law
may also
create eventually onormoiis problems for

society as well

as the indiviual.

As Richard Flathman points out:

Despite its apparent virtues, however,
habitual
unreflective conformity with particular rules
on the part of any very sizable se.-nient
of a
populace can be a source of difficulties. Law,
after all, is an instrument that human boin^js
use to serve their purposes, to assist thorn"
in acliieving their objectives. Particuiar
legal rules are ordinarily passed to solve
some problems or meet come need. The sense
that they do so is what lies behind the
sense that they are important and should be
obeyed.
When moii conform to them in an
unthinking manner this sense is lost. One
result of such a development is th;<t a sense
of the importance of a law cannot bo conveyed to new generations. Since tlie latter
may find the habits of their elders unattractive, and since the elders have lost the
capacity to defend their own behavior-, conflict may develop oetween generatioi;s
Similarly, technological and other types of
change may take place that render the laws
inappropriate. Since conformity to the laws
has become unthinking, these changes and/or
their implicatloxis for the laws may go
unnoticed and neither the laws nor the
behavior patterns associated with them will
be changed to adapt to them. The most general and most danger'ous oiatcome of such a
situation is the accumulation of social
problems until a crisis is reached, ^9

liichard Flathman, Political Obligation
Atheneum, I972), p. 59,

,

(New York:

'
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In addition, when authority is above one
and rules

are handed down an individual is still in some
sense a

means rather than an end.

He is a tool of an alien law,

no natter how fair the law may bo.

This is the basis

of Rousseau's contention that sovereignty cannot
be dele-

eated and that representative covernraent is inadequate.
When the law is a creation of the coimnunity one develops
a deeper coianiitment to the community and the whole struc-

ture of moral discourse because the rules are one's own.

And alonfj these lines, the mere continued existence of

moral codes is no proof of their necessary connection to
the

coniraon {;ood,

Xn fact v/here moral codes are net the

result of a participant process the moral law is likely
to embody the treatment of some Avithin the community as

moans to others' ends.
The final argument for this view of community also
is connected to the social view of man I have been defendin,^.

Human nature develops in society and is an

out^-^rowth of the concepts and institutions of society.

A society, the institutions and ideolo^^y of which are
based on the assumption that man can create his own

moi^al

laws will have more chance of functioning in this way and
thus of meeting the full requirements of personhood
r-ketchcd

i'.bovc

.

This is not to say that in an unlimited

eenso wiohinfj makes it so, but there is no

^^ood

reason not
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to proceed fron, the most opti«iistic
assumption given the

plausibility of

o

participant view of n,an.^^

Yet with Rousseau's understanding of
the role of society anu history in the development of
the humaii personality, one who accepts his framework
is unlikely to adopt
a revolutionary posture toward existing
society.

A social

view of human nature makes one reluctant to
accept social
transformation within a short time frame. In this
view
what vo are if. in part constituted by the
institutions
and practices of our society.
One can be both a
radical

in terms of his appraisal of the ultimate worth
of par-

ticular social practices and a reformist in terms of the
immediate changes he is seeking.

In fact both perspectives

are necessitated by Rousseau's social view of man.

Rousseau sustained both positions

j.n

That

his o\m practical

work becomes clear from a look at his work on Poland,

He

tells us that, "Unless you are thoroughly familiar with
the

n;.;tion

for

v;]iich

you are working, the labor done on

its behalf, however excellent in theory, is bound to proye

faulty in practice."
20

See William Connolly, "Theoretical Self-Consciousness,
in William Connolly and Glen Gordon, ods . Social S ti-ucturtj
and I' olitic al Tl;.c-'orv, ( Lc-^ington
D, C. Heath Co.7"l97^^^7
and Arnold KaufKiann, "Human Nature cind Participatory
Detnocracy, " in William Connolly, od., The Bias of Pluralism
(N3W York:
Atherton, I969).
,

:
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Conclusion
In this chapter we have soen that to draw from
the

doctrine of man's social nature a view of morality which
argues that a moral code is any set of rules by which

social practices are recul^-ted is inadequate.

The in-

adequacy lies on two levels.
In the first place in all cultures moral codes will

have certain forraal graramatical traits.
not accidental.

social nature.

And this fact is

It is a consequence of man's moral and

Moral codes must transcend self-interest

narrowly conceived for this is the purpose of morality
and a requirement of social life.

The logical requirements

of reversibility and universability follow

pose.

Thus it

beco'.nes

froDi

this pur-

possible to criticize certain

practices v/ithin a society as inconsistent with basic
laoral requirements.

We do not need to start with the'

presumption that all social practices in a given society
have an adequate reason for existence,
Aiid

secondly

I

have souftht to

shov; that ar^^uments

can

be advanced to defend criteria by which w© may judge the

content given to the concept of person in various cultures.
Some institutions may be defended in ways consistent with
the formal grammar of moral terms, but an impoverished

notion of the person may be assumed,

A recognition of the
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nature of human action, including the
notion that man
makes rules and is not a more object,
leads to a view of
the participant capacity of individuals.

Reco^^^nition of

this capacity provides substantive as
well as formal

criteria by which to

judf?e

societies.

It was because

Rousseau was aware of the full consequences of
a social
view of man that he could reject an abstract
individualist
conception of man and yet find grounds for the
rejection
of complete cultural relativism.
In the last chapter I will illustrate some of the

critiques and questions generated by a Rousseauian view
of man and social science.

The significance of this

perspective will become more clear by comparing those
few critical perspectives on pluralism within the

utilitarian tradition with

view generates.

tl.oso

which a Rousseauian

In elaborating a participant perspective,

I will examine possible attitudes toward technology,

the

structure of government decision making, and the role of

workers in the modern corporation.

These themes are all

related and will be tied in with current controversies
about decentrali;;ation .

Lastly I will briefly consider

appropriate strategies of change.
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C

HUMAN NATUIiE

.\ND

H A P T E R

VI

CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN DEMOCiUCY

Today it is a commonplace that our modern liberal
welfare otato is under{?oing a crisis of confidence.

The

crisis goes beyond any particular set of policies
and

touches the nature of our institutions themselves.

Yet

the remedies being su^^^ested, especially the most
thoughtful,

owe deep intellectual debts to classical political

theory.

The growing crisis of liberalism is of course

not primarily a consequence of developments solely within
the intellectual community, but the nature and direction

of responses is often very much affected by one's philo-

sophical debts.

These debts are, however, not always

recognized, with the consequence that some of the fundaraental assumptions dividing the critics of contemporary

practice are not brought out.

One critical standpoint

is concerned with the fragmentation of government in-

stitutions and sees currently the demise of a government
of laws.

Another major critical tradition, while also

concerned with rule of law, seeks to combine it with
opportunities for genuine participation in government
and Gociety,

I

will show

tViat

the first tradition descend

intellectually from Hobbes and Locke, whereas the second
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derives its view of

and society from Kousseau.

r.;an

The critics Generally take as their starting
point
the conviction that pluralism in some sense
is
an ade-

quate empirical characterization of our society,
though
this pluralism is differently interpreted than
in the

traditional Dahl-Truman'' mold.
Wolff

2

Kariel, Bachrach, and

see American pluralism as a system which puts

political power into the hands of a few well organized
and traditionally accepted pressure groups, which in

turn are controlled by oligarchies.

In other words

modern pltaralism is conservatively biased in two senses.
It favors established groups and within even these groups

real political power is in the hands of insulated group
leaders.

Pluralist theory has, follov/ing the lead of

Joseph Schuiiipeter
among elites.

,

redefined democracy as competition

In its attempt to create a "realistic"

theory of democracy, the radical normative implications
of classical democratic theory have been cast aside and

^

David Truman, The Governmental Process
1951).

Kjiopf,

(New York:

,

'

2

Henry Kariel, The Prom ise of P^olitics (Englcwood
Cliffs: Prentice-Ilall, 196077 Peter Bachrach, The Theory
of Democrati c Elitism, (Uoston:
Little Bro\/n, 19u7), and
Robert Paul Wolff, i±ie^ i-'overty of Liberalism (i3oston:
Beacon Press, I968),
,

,

[

3

See Bachrach, op

.

and Cai'ole Pateman, Partici T heory (Cambridge: Cambridge
cit

pation ai yl i)oi!iocrat.lc
University Press, 'l^yoY,

<>

,

,
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democracy has been made a conservative
doctrine.
cenoral terms one could characterize Kariel

In

and Bachruch

especially as making a critique of our society
on participant torns.
Theodore Lowi and Grant McConnell are also
disturbed
by the implications of current Anierican pluralist
practice, but they view pluralism and its defects
in somewhat

different teruis.^

The principal problem, for them, is

not BO much that interest groups play a role in the

niakin,-;

of public policy; rather each private group has appro-

priated unto itself that area of public policy by vhich
it is most ai footed.

Thus the railroads and rail unions

have taken over the ICC and large commercial farmers

control the farm program.

Lowi and McConnell emphasize

slightly different aspects of the problem.

McConnell is

concerned with the practice of grass-roots administration
of federal programs, a practice which usually amounts to
the administration of such policies as farm relief by

local fainnor committees.

Within these narrow constituen-

cies it is easy for the most powerful farmers to dominate.
One siDecial poworfui interest is likely to dominate within

Theodore

T[he Knd of Liberalism
(New York:
I969) and Grant McConnell, Private
Power an^ Am erican D emocrocy (New York: Alfred A.
Knopf, 1966y.

Lov/i,

,

W, Norton and Co.,

,

W.
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a narrow constituency,

and thus the American ideal of

errass rootE

democracy really means domination by
different
powerful special interests.^ Lowi sees the same
sort
of

process as coininc about at the federal level as well.

The

philosophy of interest proup liberalism, which states
that
those interests tiost affected by a policy should be
represented in the interior processes of decision making,
has led to a situation where power is delef^ated to ad-

ministrative a^jencies without any clear standard of delegation.

The agencies are both confused and lacking in

public understanding, support, or even visibility.

They

are easily capturea by the private interests v/ith which

they deal.
ficed.

In the process the public interest is sacri-

In short, the v/orks of both Lowi and McConnell

heavily stress the loss of the public interest under our
current pattern of policy making.

Thus McConnell cites

Instances where public works projects have been carried
out to serve the needs of powerful local construction

companies though at the expense of environmental and

aesthetic concerns.

These concerns are shared by all of

us, but v/ithin any one narrow locality these public

concerns are not strong enough to override the demands
of those private firms.
^Op. cit

,

Lowi attempts to show that in-

McConnell, Ch. k.
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torer.t group liberalism cannot plan
and cannot achieve

jvastico.

The po^/er of eovernment lends sanction
to decisions really made by powerful private
concerns. The ICC
enfjafTcs in r. process of case by case
barfjaining which
serves the interests of the most powerful
railroads.

Federal housin.- policy is taken over by the
banks and
real estate firms, with the result that federal
policy
has subsidized the white flight from the big
cities

and

also prevented tho intecration of the new white
suburbs.
I do not

wish to imply that these critiques of plur-

alism are incompatible or that there is no overlap between
thein.

But they differ in emphasis and in basic assumptions,

something which becomes clear when we examine the positive

proposals which emanate from the two perspectives.

Differ-

ent concepts are emphasized by the two groups, a fact

which provides a key to the underlying assumptions.

To

Kariel, Bachrach, and V/olff, participation and community
are tho terms emphasized.

Though the injustices and

conservative biases of the system are clearly recognized,
these are seen as outgrowths of the non-participatory

structure of

i^jodorn

life.

Even if these problems could

be solved without important institutional changes, these

improvements would be regarded as far from satisfactory.
The

Iccy

concepts underlying the 1/Owi-McConnell criticisms

cire

tlie

public interest and goveininent of law.

And for
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them the concept of the public interest
takes on
wliat

different meaning? than in radical works.

a

son.e-

It tends to

be equated with diffused or social floods which
most of us
want but which will not be satisfied within
the confines
of the market.
National defense is the classic instance
of such a social good. The term is not used by
them to

include devGlopment of a deeper sense of the needs of
others and thus development of one's self through par-

ticipation in a community.

I will return to this theme

later.

The importance of this difference in emphasis becomes

obvious when we examine the ways in which the two sides

define the current crisis in legitimacy as well as their

proposed remedies.

One of the major themes in

Lovri

»

book is the crisis of confidence in /American institutions.
He repeatedly defines this crisis in terms of the inability

of a fragmented government really to govern, especially its

failure to make clear choices as expressed in unambiguous
laws.

The radical critics are bothered by a general lack

of real self-government and participation,
Lowi advocates an effective federal government which

could truly be called a government of law,

McConnell

wants to strengt^len the nationalizing tendencies of the

American political system.

Federalism wab initially a

compromise rather than an ideal.

Its nature has changed
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and can continue to do so.

Reforms which vould stren,-then

such institutions as our national parties
are needed.
Alonfj siiailar lines Lov/i wants to stop
the centrifugal

tendencies within the federal government itself.

His

call for juridical democracy is simply a derncmd
that

Congress and the administrative agencies themselves
reverse thoir abdication of responsibility. His principal

criticism is that interer.t groups have beon allowed

participation in the interior processes of decision
making?.

He believes that various special interests have

taken over particular a^^encies and reflate themselves
in their ovm interest.

Juridical deniocracy would require

of Con^-^ress and the acencies that they make clear laws

rather than allow special interests to bargain

ovei"

policies.
Lovri

and McConnell both work within a Madisonian

view of politics.

Government is to guarantee equal

rights for all, and it can do this best in a situation
whe3:'e

there are multiple competing interest groups.

They

suppoi^t a pluralist politics when many groiips can be in

the ar&na all the time.

Powerful special interests will

cancel each other out and formal political leadership

will then be able to fashion policies in the public
interest.

This view stresses the role of formally elected

elites and identifies legitimate government basically
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with policy outcomes.

It also assumes and accepts
as

inevitable the self-interes tedness of
groups, which are
thou,oht to be composed of the
self-interested individuals
who benefit from then,.
Little thought presumably

is e;iven

to the structure of these groups
as long as there is a

relatively balanced competition among them.

Unlike llobbes

there is no assumption that government's
only legitimating
task is to preserve order; government can
secure certain
positive conditions for the private development
of all.

But there is no assumption that political
society has a
role in the development of full moral and
communal sense
of the individual. The lack of any ccncern with
problems
of human development and political socialization
is

conspicuous in both Lowi and McConnell.
Both Lowi and McConnell are completely opposed to any

response to the current crisis which involves decen-

tralization and community control.

Lowi explicitly

attacks the poverty war for its attempt to solve the

problems of poverty by giving the poor some power in the

administration of programs intended to benefit them.
effect,

cis

The

he sees it, is to create one more area of

public policy to be appropriated by a private group.

Lowi

remarks that there will be time enough to decentralize
once a public interest has been established and articulated
in public policy.

Again his primary interest seems to be
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the consistency and clarity of public
policy outcomes. To

Give urban renewal or housin,- policy to city
government
is to make these policies the prero^^atives
of the local
real estate and construction industries.
It is at this point that the dispute
between Lowi and

the other £?roup of political scientists and
new left

critics becomes the most apparent.
I

They would argue, and

think correctly, that Lowi has only partially
understood

the present crisis in legitimacy.

Especially in the

ghettoes there has emerged a black consciousness which

wishes to express itself through development of

a

different

life style and control over the immediate aspects of
their

lives.

This emerging consciousness is in part a reflection

of ineffective and unjust national policies, but it is

inadequate to regard it solely in this light, for it
expresses a deeper aspect of the human personality neglected
by Lockian and Madisonian theory, the desire to be

by laws of one's

ov/n

botind

making.

The new left critics call for a participant society.

The crisis of legitimacy

roust

be resolved by turning

important powers over schools, housing, police forces to
smaller scale political units where more direct individual

participation by the affected individuals will be possible.
The suggestion that industry be democratized is also an

important part of this program.

In some authors tiiis

131

moans control over day-to-day working arrangements
and
discipline.
In others it means actual control
of all

important corporate decisions.^
Now it is in the spirit of Rousseau's concern
for

moral and conniuhal development that modern theories
of

decentralization and participation have been developed.
Such theorists as Bachrach and Kariel feel that the
modern
concept of democracy has lost an important dimension.
The aim of Rousseau was to provide a set of institutions
in v/hich full participation would be possible and thus

moral development would occur.

Policy outcomes provide

only one perspective in this participant theory.

As in

the case of both Plato and liousseau, modern participant

theory seeks the creation of institutions which fit man's
full developmental potential.

The assumption of par-

ticipant theory is that the participant community makes

possible man's full humanity.

Community fosters the

mutual recof^rnition of individuals as persons, that is,
as beings who develop moral codes based on a recognition

of the needs of others and of the community as a whole.

Men learn to treat each other as subjects and freely
choose to live by a moral law.
^

Op

.

ci

. ,

Carole Pateman,
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Obviously these two critiques of modern
pluralism are
in tension with each other.
It may be possible to

iiuacine

a constructive dialo/jue between them,

but such a dialogue

can be rewardiufT only when each side fully
recognizes the
strength or the other. Each riiust deal with the
other's

strongest case.

And this A/ill come about only when all

sides become clear about the ways in which
conceptions of
human nature are implicit in this debate.

Lowi's whole argument is couched in terms of the

effects on public policy outcomes of interest group

liberalism.

And undor interest group liberalism he include

such proposals as the devolution to local authority of

major policy initiatives,
Kariel and Bachrach are concerned with the individual'

alienation from the political process and even day-to-day
life.

They focus on

sucli

©f the average American,

facts as the political apathy
To Lowi and McConnell this is

not a problem as long as the average citizen is benefitting

from satisfactory governmental policies.
In assessing Lowi's critique of contemporary American

democracy it is important to keep in mind that he remains
within the limits of a basically pluralist approach.

His

call for juridical democracy is really a reciuest

the

system become more fulJy pluralist.

tliat

As in the case of

all pluralists, the doctrine operates for him both as an
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ideal and as the basis for a description oT the system.
His picture

ol'

current ilmerican politics is one of various

groups each pushing for its own immediate interest.

Out

of the conflict of such groups, at least when the conflict

'

is as wide as possible, will eraerf^e policies which provide
the maxiinum satisfaction of the largest number of groups.

Lowi

'

s

conception of American politics and his

projected ideal are tied to a view of human nature far
different from Kariel's and Dachrach's.

His is the sort

of atomistic, a-social view of human nature which is

characteristic of the liberal tradition as far back as
Ilobbes,

The view is that men are self-interested atoins--

tliey are

born with a well defined set of innate needs or

desii^es,

such as for power, property, security.

Society

exists for and is created by the quest of men to fulfill
these needs.

The individual person, embodying these

developed interests, needs, and purposes is not only

morally but logically and temporally prior to society and
the state.

His conception of human nature includes no theory of

moral development within society.

In a discussion praising

Madison's Fodorali st number ten, Lowi argues

tliat

we must

assume that groups will always pursue their self-interest.

Madison in Federalist 10 defined the group
("faction") as a "number of citizens, whether
amounting to a majority or minority of the

13^

whole, who are united and actuated by some
coniiiion impulse or passion, or of
interest,
advorse to the ri,'Tht of othor citize ns, or
iiL«

iJi£

poriiiancnt /nui av:VTrc^:at e int ore-st s'
(liiiiphasis

'added.

^f

Uavid
Trum^ui uses ivadisons's definition but cuts
the quotation just before the emphasizod
part.
In such a manner pluralist tlieory
boca'ne the complete handmaiden of interest
group liberalism.
.To the Madisonian.
.
groups were necessary evils much in need
of ref^ulation. To the modern pluralist
(groups are /rood; they require accommodation,
£2ijliir[i£liiv

.

)

.

,

.

A revived feeling of distrust toward interests
and groups would not destroy pluralist theory
but would only prevent its remaining a servant
of a completely outmoded system of public
endeavor.
.Such distrust of prevailing
theory might then lead to discomfort with
tho jurisprudence of delegation of power,
for it too rests mightily upon an idealized
view of how groups hiake law today,?
,

While one might not wish to quarrel with Lewi's statement
as an assessment of how present day interest groups
actually'' function,

what is noteworthy is his assumption

that groups must always behave this way.

He does not

consider the possibility that groups and individuals
might move beyond a narrov/ self-interest under the
right forms of social life, and he cannot consider this

possibility because he has no conception of human development in a social context.

Human beings are merely

creatures of a given self-interest.
'^

Op.

c it

,

Lowi, pp. 296-297.

,
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Lowi's policy proposals unite an abstract individ-

ualist

viev.'

of man with the conviction that social science

can yield the same sort of refjularities as those in the
natura;i

sciences.

If one channels enough interests into

the political process they will cancel each other out in

such a way that the public interest will inevitcibly emerge.

Simple alterations of the system can produce automatic
changes.

Lowi is in effect assuminfj law like regularities

in the system, an assumption made e^isier by a conception
of a fixed human nature.

Such political tlieoi^ists as Bachrach and Kariel derive
from Kousseau assumptions about human nature contrary to
those of

Lo'^/i

,

Man is not an isolated atom with a set

of given interests and needs

x^rhich

exist apart from society.

Rather man becomes what he is within a social structure.

Society in

larf?o

measure constitutes his make-up.

lie

learns a language and a set of roles and from these he

learns his needs and purposes.

evil are.

He learns what good and

Apart from ur before the existence of society

men are not good or evil, for they have no conception of
these.

Men in any society are not therefore atoms of selfinterest.

They have roles and act in terms of the con-

ception of them.sclvos developed in their socially created
roles.

This does not moan that they never act in ways we
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would want to call self-interested.

But even what ^oes

under the label self-interest is in part
constituted by
the conception of rnnn developed within a social

framework.

Tlie

quest for property is sornethinff wo learn as

v.e

learn

language and roles, for the forms of property differ
in
various societies. iln individual learns who he is
and

what his self-interest is as he learns his social role.

Dachrach derives from iiousseau the recognition that
the existence of society depends upon

of rif;ht and wron^.

nsen

who have a sense

Men must have learned who they are,

includinf^ thoir duties to society at large.

Man is a

creature who follows rules he learns in society rather than
a programmed being who follows his preformed desires.

Society cannot exist without certain general moral
rules,

Rousseau does not believe that the existence of

morality is a mere matter of convention or that moral
codes guarantee efficiency in the pursuit ©f pleasure,
as did Hume.

Like Kant he believed that there are cer-

tain basic criteria which any moral system will meet and
this must necessarily be the case.

Morality is that

higher order system of rules which provides a standard
above self-interest and thus guarantees the existence
of society as such.

Rousseau did not of course believe that any existing
society was fully developed morally.

Men did not recog-
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the breadth or the extent of their
dependence on others
and or. society in ^ener^a. Thus while
rocofrnizin;: some

duties to other men, they were always tryinto take
advantage oT them in amne aspects of their lives.

Our

institutions do not make us fully conscious of
the needs
of others as complete human boin^-s
In some aspects

and

.

relcitionships others become objects for our use.

knew that Ilobbes was not completely

Rousseau

Only the

wronf^.

problem was that hobbos described the modern bourgeois
individual socialized to limited moral awareness and
certain forns of self-interested competition with his
fellows.

Rousseau recof^nized that the fully developed moral
person emer{^es from the proper process of moral decisionmakinc:.

An understanding of the concept of the fjeneral

will in Rousseau makes this point clear.

Rousseau argued

that one is le^^itimat e ly bound only by the general will,
V.'o

have seen that in his analysis of the general

will Rousseau makes

tw^o

significant points.

He believes

that the good society is one where all men are clearly

aware of their moral dutie.s to others.

Fully to follow

rules, which is part of being social, is not merely to
folloAv tliem from habit but to understand and follow them

from leflective choice.

The r.econd related argument is

that men acliievo this full moral development (and in fact

t-liis

138
is part of his conception of moral
development) when

they create the most in.portnnt rules
which euidc their
society. Men f.ain the clearest conception
of themselves
as social bein.^s, includin^^ ex fxxll
sense of the depth of
their ties to other persons, Avhen they
participate with
their fellows in the creation of laws which
affect
all.

The dispute between Lowi and Bachrach involves

fundamentally different conceptions of human nature.
Lowi can be less concei-ned with widening
opportunities
for participation because he sees human nature as
an

abstract Kivon entity.

now are beiiig

iaa'c

As long as the desires people have

things are fine and there is no neces-

sity for participation.

expression of

a

What people feel now is an

given human nature.

Bachrach believes

that people are social beings who learn who they truly
are and what their real needs are only when they par-

ticipate fully in political life.

ii

achrach criticizes

Dahl, and his argument is equally applicable to Lowi, for

treating participation as dispensable

\.hen one is alretidy

getting what he wants from society.
Dahl fails
.to conceive of political
participation two-dimensionally
as
instrumentality to obtain end results and
as a process thtit affords h±in the opportunity to gain a greater sense of purpose
and pride in himself and a greater awareness
of cotii!iiunity
In jiousseauian tcri:i3, Dahl
.

.

:

.
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lailecl to consido:c pcirt icl pat ion
as a

hc-is

process throu-h which man can becone
a

nu'ster of hiruaelf .^^
Throuf.^h

participation people develop

a

new sense of

needs, such as for fellowship, conmmnal
pleasures, and
joint participation and intellectual
development itself.
As social beincs our needs do not remain
constant. The
satisfaction of these communal needs comes to
mean more
to people than those earlier needs felt
before political

participation.

Thus political participation is not one

^ood whoso value can be compared in utilitarian
terms
with other coods, because it is a process or way

of life

which chances our perception of all
words a

^^ood in

of man,

It is in other

itself.

While I believe
can be built for

tjoods.

sonjo

t}iat

tlie

philosophical case

stron^i;er

version of Rousseau's social view

in the next part of this essay I will confine

myself to showin;^ that a more fruitful debate between the

policy proposals espoused by

eacli side

becomes possible

when we reco^jnize clearly the depth and origin of the
"paradifjm" dispute we face here.

While I will proceed

from basicalJy Rousseauian as suinptions

,

I

think it possible

to learn more from other positions when we are self-

conscious about our own and our opponents basic per-

Peter Dachrach, "Interest, Participation, and Democratic Theory," (Unpublished paper).

spectives,
Lowi can so easily equate participation
and doceii-

tralization

devolution to conventional units or
local
government or cooptation or local elites
because he is
v.ith

not

concerned with hunan development and does
not see that this
is one principal concern of the new left
critics.
Thus

neither he nor McConnell sees that the New
Left want to
restructure local decision making bodies in such

a way that

the power

minimized.

traditional elites, or of any elite, will be
A set of procedures, to be discussed below,

should be desie-ned to maximize the opportunities
of

persons to participate in decisions which most affect
them.
This is neither cooptation of favored local people,
v/ith

its conservative impact, nor transfer of power to
traditional

local bureaucracies.

Smaller more homog-eneous constituencies

will be created within lar^c cities and in these constit-

uencies real attempts to institutionalize the participation of all will bo made.

Decentralization in this sense will not fully please
Lowi because it could cause some f ra^^ment ation of policy,
but his lack of concern for development leads him not to

consider these chanf^es in the radical notion of decen-

tralization and what they hope to achieve.
cannot woifjh

tlio

Thus he

costs of possible policy f rafjmenttition

a{?ainst the /vains of human development.

Jlis

lack of concern
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for ouestions of

hu,-.,an

aevelop.ont is also reveulc-d
in uis

inadequate perspective on the
en,er«ence of the public
AS wo have s.en, Lowi is woxriod
that an effective
pro,,ran. of decentralization
would fragment an already
divided nation, and one would ri,,htly
i..,,ine that in such
a climate a public interest
could not be developed.
I do not see any ea.,y resolution
to this dilemma,
but a number of points are relevant.
In the first place
son,e of the reforms su^Tf^ested
by Lowi and McConnell could
make for easier development of true
national policies, such
as welfare reform and environ.nental
laws.
But I am convinced
that such laws will be easier to pass
and implement if
they are at least in part the result of
public interest

politics.

We need the einerf^^ence of more and
stronger

public interest groups, to borrow a term from
Schatt-

schneider.9

The many ties between government and
business

and the concentrated power of

h±c:

business''^ make it far

easier for people to organize on the basis of
occupational
groups for the sake of private advanta^^e
In addition
a

.

prevailing- ethos which rer;ards the pursuit of private
9 E,

York:

E. S chat t Schneider, The Somi-Sov eroifrn People
Holt, ifinehart, and Winston, lyoO), Ch TT"^
.

or a dir.cussxon of these ties see John Kenneth
Galbraitli, J^conoinics ajrui the Public Purpo.se
( Boston:
Houf^hton Mifflin Co., I973 ) ,
I'

.

.

(New

lh2

monetary advantaco as natural contributes to the
effect.

sanio

It is the f;reat strength of the Rousseauist

tradition to recof.nize that in the proper institutional
setting- nion can learn to have other brotidor concerns.

A major problem with both pluralism and Lowi is
that
a concern for policy outcomes has obscured
consideration

of the political potential v/hich produces those outcomes.

A developed political community

ctvn

grow throu^^h partic-

ipation and provide the thrust for new pro^^rams.
too extreme a level of participation,
to listen to experts,

While

such as unwillingness

can be a threat to effective solutions,

the problem today is to find a constituency at all concerned

with public interest problems.
One reason for the lack of interest by political

scientists and other commentators in problems of partic-

ipation and human development has been a

paradifira amon^^

historians which associates the rise of totalitarianism

with extreme levels of political particpation

,

Yet

writinf^ durin^^ the thirties, John Dewey made some sugges-

tive remarks which indicate the possibility of covering
the disturbing facts oT Nazi Germany with another theo-

retical perspective at least equally convincing.

Democ-

racy fell in Germany not because there was too much of it

Ik3

but because it

^.as

not part of the fabric of daily
lifej^

If wc con offer equally plausible
and more potentially

optiniotic explanations of political
extremism, .ve have
strong case for advising political
scientists to work

a

on the basis of paradie:ms which
assume the potential for

human development.

For what human nature can accomplish

is in part a consec.uence of the way we
view it and the

social institutions which are an outgrowth
of our beliefs.
The indications of voter irrationality in
the behaviorist
literature
should be seen not as proof of man's

""^

irre-

versible irrationality, but as inadequacies
fostered by
the present system beyond which individuals
cam develop.
We should be chastened by the recognition that
no remedial

action in the form of

ijis ti tutional

engineering can be

final, but that human beings can transcend present
social

evils.
We are left with the conclusion that a constituency

^^Jolm Dewey,

"Democracy and Educational Administration,"

iiOii S'^ci(ity.

Vol. 23,

(April, I937).
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William Connolly, "Theoretical Self -Consciousness
In
William Connolly and Glen Gordon, eds., Social Structure and
Political Theory (Lexington: D. C. ileatii and Co., 197^)
and Arnold ivaufmann, "JIuman Mature and Participator Democracy," in Connolly, ed., Th_c )ias oi^ i>luralisn] (New York:
Atherton Press, I969),
,

.

t

CDee

Voter

,

especially Angus Campbell et al.

(New York:

Wiley, I960).

.

,

The Ameri crm

for the public interest must

eiiierfje

atnonfr

men vho in their

immediate livos have had some opportunity to see
problems
from more tlian a self-interested point of
view.

Koussoau,

and Tocouevillo niter

himj^ have recognized

political participation is
such consciousnecs.

t}ie

that local

key to the development of

Participation thus may have some role

in the restructuring- of national politics.

The emergence

of local political consciousness could provide the
lever
for reform,

.-.nd

Lov;i

•

s

vork is (juite lackinp; as to the'

potential sources of reform enerf^y.''^
reforms wore mag^ically instituted,

\ve

And even if Lowi

•

s

cannot assume that

the politics of juridical democracy would insure a stron^ver

place for the public interest.

Bringing; all interests

into the national arena and hoping; for the emergence of the

public interest seems to be a modern version of Adam
Smith's wonderful \Jorld.
intei-est of all

results is

a

t}

To hope that the blind self-

ese groups will produce farseeing

kind of naive optimism on which we had better

not count.
On the othor hand it must be admitted that Bachrach

and others have slid ratlier easily past the question of the
14

Alexis clc Tocqueville,
Max Lorner and J, P. Mayer,
1966).

j

JcMiiocr;\C3^

(Ncv;

York;

in America
ed. by
Harper and iiow,
,

1

For a discussioji oi' this ])oint see yilliam Cojinolly,
"Liberalism Under Pressure," in J^oli ty Vol. 2, (spring
1970).
,
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effects of increased decentralization
and participation
In our type of society, for even
decentralization

of the

sort they envisa.ve will create
problems; and to bring about
such decentralization will itself be
a ve.y problematic

process.

Their correct recognition of the need
for more
opportunities for self-develop.nent obscures

these aspects

of the problem.

It is of course a commonplace that
our

society is hifjhly interdependent and structurally
centralized. There are risks that in many policy

areas we

would have to pay a hi^h cost for the wrong
decisions by
various local communities. And in fact self-development
at the local level will not be possible if

nomic prerequisites are not g-uaranteed.

rniniir.al

eco-

And one must also

ask whether and how effective decentralization can
be
broufjht off at all in our kind of society.

It seems to me that the insights of a Rousseauian

perspective allow the transcendence or synthesis, in a
Hof^elian sense, of both sides of this debate.

I3ecause

he was so strongly aware of the social nature of man,

Rousseau's concern for self-development never led him
to advocate simplistic repudiation of the existing

society.

He was not the sort of radical to exclaim: "Burn

it all down and start all over again!"

In his work on

existing societies he recognized that his ideals could

never be fully attained.

And he knew that reform pi-oposals

•
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would have to embody compromises with
existing? injustices.
He argued, for example, that serfs in
Poland
could not

be immediately freed because they Avere not
ready for the

responsibilities of froedon.
emancipation was necessary J ^

Some program of gradual
But Jiousseau also knew that

his ideal was nonetheless relevant as a standard
by v/hich
to jud^^e existing- societies and as a guide
to directions

for reforms.

Rousseau was free of the illusion of so many

contemporary political theorists who assume that ideals
which cannot be easily and quickly implemented are
irrelevant,

"merely" Utopian faninsies.

A full Rousseauian perspective will then transcend

excessive obeisance to existing society and a simplistic
It will do this through a two pronged attack

utopiariisra.

by advocating a set of specific reforms which could at
least eventually be achieved in some degree within the

political system and then by encouraging the development
of other

politics.

"ne^^r

culture" alternatives outside conventional

These

be complementary.

tv/o

prongs of the attack are and must

1

Let me begin first with the more practical political

Jean-Jacques Rousseau, "Considerations on tlie Government of Poland," in Frederick l.atkins, ed,, Po litcal Ur_itinr;3
of Jean-Jr'cques J^oussoau (Edinburgh; Nelson^ 1933)
pp. 159-187.
,

1

Though I do not exactly follow him, I have gained
insights from Pliilip Slater, The Pursuit of ]>onelincB3
(Host on:
Beacon i^iess, 1970),

,

1^7

side or the attack.

(Though

I am

not in.plyin^ that the

political will to implement these
proposals is here or can
be immediately generated.)
In the first place some aspects of
Levi's j^iridical

democracy are useful even from the
perspective of a more
participant orientation to politics. The
tenure of

statutes proposal and the requirement that
Congress rather
than administrative agencies make laws^^
are useful in that
they may force interest groups and their le^iders
to deal

with Congress and thus become more public.

Proposals

which will force interest group leaders to deal with
each
other and Congress as openly as possible cire to be
encouraged because making the process of interest group
dealings more public will put pressure on the leaders to
reform their own organizations in the direction of greater

rosponsiveneos to membership.

i3ut

in saying this we must

remember that Congressional Committees themselves all too
easily have developed tacit ties to special interests.
suggests that Lowi

•

s

This

reforms can be more effective when

part of a general reform of Congress itself.

There are other

obviouf.i

ways in v/hich federal policy

can be effective and is in fact absolutely necessary in
18

Op

.

.

ci t

,

Lowi, Ch. 10,

Iks

foMterinr; a nore participant society.

Rousseau correctly

recofrni>.ed t)mt men who were Tinancially
enslaved to others

could not participate as full independent
beings in the
dovelop..ent of the .general will.

On one level this insi^^ht

can be pressed into a full critique of the
capitalist

economic system; but at the level of contemporary
politics
it needs to be pressed toward continuin^j demands
for tax

reform.

One of the

thin/'.s

which the federal

f^overnnient

±3 uniquely equipped to do is to collect taxes in an

efficient manner.

The tax system needs to be pushed errad-

ually toward {jroater income equality.

And part of this

must be profcrams for cuaranteed annual incomes.

Truly

ptirticipant communities cannot be created by men who are

worried about where their next meal is coming- from.

Equally important to the development of community
reasonable de^jree of national economic stability.

is a

This

means the control of inflation and the avoidance of severe
economic downturns.

In an interdependent economy effective

federal power will also be needed for this purpose, and
experience has shown that an interest
to prices and

price fluctuations.
a,';ainst

liberal a[)proach

policy is inadequate.

wa^;-e

But stable communities

militates

;^;roup

doend upon

more than minimal

One aspect of modern society which

stability is rapid technolof^icnl

and technolojr^i cal unemployment,

chanfjc

historically our tax

1^9
pcTlicy has favored technoloc-ical innovation,

allowing;

corpor.itions larf^o v/ritc ofxr. for investment in
new

technology.

.Jut

the concern lor ever expanding,- economic

abundance leads us to pursue technolo^_^y wlxcrever
it leads.
The quGGtion of abundance for v.hat is not asked.
Ways of

life and coiurnunities are constantly disrupted and

tlie

pace

of technolop;ical change severs the crenerations and
increase
the already patholo/;ical fixation on youth in our
culture.

Technology and abundance need to be subordinated to a
concern for human happiness, and federal econonic policy
can play a role here by ceasing to encourage those

technological innovations which can oe justified solely
by increased productivity, corporate profits regardless of

damage to the social and natural environment.

Participant reforms must also involve the large

corporation more directly than in matters of tax policy.
If federal policy must create the proper context for

participation, it must also open up opportunities for

participation of both a geographic and functional sort.
It is becoming increasingly difficult today to deny

that

tiie

large corporation is a public, political entity.

Government policy should be chiinged by requiring fedei'al
19

There are uany statements of this
is Michael iicagan, Tiro i'i;jnaged JCconomy
University Press, I903),

tlieiDe
,

.

Among them

(Wew York:

t)xford

'
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charters for private corporations, and
a major condition
for the granting of such charters
would be that corporation:

include effective mechanisms for the
representation of
consumers and workers in their decision
makinr:

processes.

This is far from a full answer to the
problems created by
the corporate capitalist structure of
our economy
but it

is an effective first step which will ^jive
many more

persons the chance to pai-^ticipate in decisions
having
a larc-e effect on their daily lives.

There will need to

be considerable exporirnen tation as to the forms
which this

will take so as to minimize the role of now workers
and
consur-ier elites.

a role,

Represent ativo bodies

have to play

^^rill

but ima^^inativo uses of committees and provisions

for mandates, recalls, and public meetings can mitifjate
the undesirable effects of representation.

Especially

at this level of the individual plant local study g:roups

and political action groups can begin two-way communication

with leadership as well as manage some of the more immedlate plant concerns. 20
It may

seeir,

to some that these proposals

v^^ill

result

in a decline in economic efficiency for the American
20

.

Elvander, "Democracy und Largo Organizations,"
in Gideon Sjoberg and M, Donald Hancock, eds., i'olitcs
in the Po s t-V/e If are S t at e
(New York:
Columbia University
Press, 1 972), p. 31^+
Nxlfj

,
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corporation.
least to

son,e

This is certainly true in that
it will at
extent generate a concern about
the effects

of technolo,,y on the worker
qua worker.

The proposals

seem more reasonable when we realize
that demand for the
continuing, hi^h levels of production
is only n.ade possible
by an artificially induced levels
of demand.
Automation
and technolo^Tical progress already
have created problems
about unemployment, and only increased
public sector spending; in th-3 area of personal
services, such as for teachers,
social workers, etc., can be^in to alleviate
our unemployment problems.
American economic development is at a
"

point where decent comfort can be assured
without continuin/5
the obsessive concern for increased corporate
efficiency.

Thus far it would seem

tliat

my reform proposals for

the creation of a more participant society have
entailed

the creation of a more powerful federal fjovernment

.

This

is correct because decentralized prrticipant communities

stand any chance of working- only in the proper context,
and federal power properly used is one of the most important instruments for the creation of that context.

Federal policy must also directly make possible

increased participation at the local level.
21

If we examine

See Michael jlarrinfcton
"The Politics of Poverty," in
Irvinfc ITo\/e, ed., The j^adical Pa pers
(New York:
Doubleday,
^'
1965).
,

,
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local

co.,r.unit:i.cs

zonin,,,

we i'lnd that they face decisions
about

the education of their children,

the regulation

of industries in their boundaries,
the administration of
their, police, the construction of
new houses and recreation
facilities.
Lhen we cx-::i,ine this list of issues
and
functions, ^mich does not purport to be
cor.plete, we will
see that important distinctions need
to be made.
In the

present state of our economy it is
inconceivable that
some of tho areas should be handled
primarily at
the

local level.

"

The social costs would be too enormous.

The

task of re^ulatinf; pollution must be federal
because

corporations go beyond the boundaries of local
neif^hborhoods, and because local regulation A/ould
allow
corpor-

ations to play off one community against another
in the
pursuit of the lowest bidder. The regulation of
pollution
has a direct effect upon society and failure to
perform
this task adequately will bo catastrophic in its
results.
But there are other areas on this list where the

results of the policy adopted will have a direct and

immediate imptict mainly on the local community.

The local

community will have to pay the largest and most immediate
price for failure to educate its children properly or

adequately design public housing, recreation and urban
ronev;al.

I

am not suggesting that decisions here will

have no impact on the larger metropolitan

.oixja

or the nation
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as a whole.

In our kind of society there are no such
areas;

but where tho direct brunt of the decision
must be borne
by the local community, a concern for human
development

dictates that responsibility for these decisions
be delcto that community.

f-^ated

And by this I do not mean that

urban renewal, education, etc., be delegated to
existincv
city governments, whicli is the net result of current
revenue sharing.

These functions must be turned over to

truly local neighborhoods so that decisions will be made
by people who have some sense of daily relationships to

each other.

I

do not have ))rccise formulas for the

achievement of this goal, but federal programs should
begin to carry as requirements local plans for effective
decentralization.

Educational assistance can require the

creation of local neighborhood school boards; urban

renewal projects can include the right of veto to groups

immediately affected in the ghetto.
When we "decentralize" to cities as a whole, these

constituencies may indeed be dominated by large private
firms,

lJut

such need not be the case when functions are

turned over to many smaller areas, including ghetto

communities,

A large number of such constituencies cannot

be controlled by small,

localized affluent groups

«

De-

centralization will dislodge those traditional elites.
It may be true,

as Grant McCoiniell has charged, that
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vithin tho

sir.all

policy will bo

constituency

inadG

national interest.

thei^e

is a danr;er that

by elites not responsive to a lar^^cr

What ia required is that decisions

dofinirfc t!ii3 lar.Ter public (yood be made in broad constit-

uencies but

tli.it

there also be areas for important decisions

by smaller constituencies.

neichborhood

^^overniiient

The proposals here lor

and for changes in corporate

structure reflect this outlook by extendinf: some space,

both f^eofjraphic (local nci{^hbor)iOods ) and functional
(corporations) for decisions v/hich affect the group
sic:nif iccintly and yet will not undermine the public

interest.

Certain very fTeneral policies crucial to

.the

whole nation and yet beyond the scope of any one area, such
as environmental protection, will inevitably be the

prerof^ative of central authoi^ity, but v/orkers at the

plant level should have the opportunity to have a say
in the structuring of their work lives and local neif^h-

borhoods should have a say in redesigning

theii"

hoods and the schools and public facilities

Decisions

ninde

neighbor-

vv'ithin

them.

by such constituencies in these areas

will have only a marginal impact on the public interest
as conceived by Lowi and McConnell.

Indeed, providing

this kind of opportunity could strengthen concern
the public intei^cst because,

people

ar'o

\/ith

as Oaclirach points out, many

often apatiietic about larger political events,
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but they will learn the importance
of politics when they
begin to understand that politics can
have a
bearing; on

their lives.
basis for

A less apathetic electorate can
provide the

effective definitions of the public
interest
by representative bodies.
n.ore

In this connection it should also
be pointed out that

within a new coi^porate structure a loss
alienating for.,, of
work life could become a possibility, and
workers who have
been allowed to develop more fully in their
work
are

less likely to be manipulated by elites in
their work or

neighborhood life.

This will also .minimize the dangers

of power in small constituencies.

Andre Gorz su^;ge3t3

that workers who are given or who gain some chance to

affect their job situation can and should try to control a

number of specific areas.

These should include the

training schools, so that workers may have more than one
skill.

Control over the speed and rhythm of work should

be sought as well as over the kind of new techniques to
bo introduced. 2?

Alienating work life has so dulled the capacities of

many workers that they leave their jobs able only to
indulge the pursuit of

tiiose

pleasures programmed for them

22

Andre Gorz, A btrateg y for Labor
Press, 1967), pp. ^rj-hh.

,

(Boston:

Beacon
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by corporate giants.

Only if the problem of alienation
is

adec.uatcly dealt vit>. can we be^in
to fjuarantee that participation at the noifThborhood level will
be

vs widespread

as possible.
In carryinfT out decentralization to
the local coninun-

ities, a

nurr,ber

must be faced.

of practical problems and potential
dangers
We must first consider the size of
local

areas within larfye cities that wo will create.

The size

of the local community must be small enouf^h
to increase

sifrnificantly chances for individual participation
and yet
larfje enou,-h so that

decisions will not be trivial.

cities must not be so fx^agmented that coordination

subunits will be extremely difficult.

Large
arjon^-

ICxperience will

provide some clues about how to weifjh different factors.
Ethnic, historic and ,-oographic factors should bo taken
into account in defining the neighborhood areas.

How will these neighborhoods be governed?

As men-

tioned before we must design a set of procedures which

will give as many people as possible a chance to participate

directly in political decisions.

We can imagine a small

elected council having responsibility for the ongoing

administration of police, sanitation, scliools,

v/cll'are.

There arc several essays on the ()rc>bleiiis of defining
neighborhoods in Terrence E, Cook and Patrick M. Morgan,
tici pnt ory
Press, 1971) .
edjj,,

P.-i.r

ivci.iocracy ,

(San Francisco:

Canfield
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would have the rorcc oT law
and be bindin. on the
council.
Furthern,ore, council n,en.bers can
themselves be regionally
elected. This will foster direct
co.n.unicat ion
between

very small

,>roups of citizens and
political leadership.

The ,,eneral intent of these
practical

suf,,,es tions

is to

blond direct denocratic participation
with representation
in such a way that men have
alienated their sovereif.nty
neither to a representative elite nor
to an elite of

those fanatics who have the patience
to endure Ion,; neetincs.
These susfrestions also recognize that
leadership and expertise n,ust have a role in a^.y successful
organi^ation but
there is a vast difference between
experts and
,

leaders, who

must use their talents to serve the common
good and those
who define their values as the common
good.
With these
proposals even those individuals who choose
minimal involvement will still feel closer to politics.
Those xvho
make decisions affecting them will inevitably
be in much
closer contact v.-ith their immediate friends.

These proposals arc not, however, without risk and
are not guarjmtocd to end apathy. Some neighborhoods

may

yet be taken over by unrepresentative fanatics; but
these

costs must be weighed against

tlie

need for ghetto

communities especially to develop self-awareness and
respect.

Failure can bo a salutary lesson and the costs

must also be weighed against the mounting failure of
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State and city authorities

niay

set certain minimum standards

of perfornance, though problems may arise as
to what

constitutes minimum standards and what is undue interrcro:(co.

This loceii council may bo given lefi-islative

power, but we arc here

f.-.ccd

x.'ith

of delegation of responsibility.

the recurrent problem
It would seem impossible

to do away with representation at the local level
because,

as Walzor points out, most people do not want to be

political all the time.

This is especially the case in

a society where work is dull and deadening,

expect it to be for some time to come.

as we can

But perhaps the

representative principle at the neif^hborhood level can be

qualified in a number of ways.

Committees in individual

subject areas con be appointed, with additional members
comin^^ from all interested citizens.

The committee would

be fully responsible to the elected representatives, but

those with a real desire to participate would have the
chance to be lieard.

In addition, referenda and town

meetinfjs could be a possibility:

a specified perconta^je

of local voters would have the ri(jht to request either.

Decisions throufch a town meetinfj with an adequate quorum
2h

Micliael iJalzer,

Citizen," in Irvin{;

"A Day in the Life of a Socialist
ed.. Beyond the New Left

ilowe

,

.
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white liberalism to deal with the educational
and other
problems of the slums.
Tlicse proposals will mean that
individuals in their

corporate and

noi^:;hborIxo:,d

life v.ill have some ch.Mnco to

participate in the decisions the consequences
of
will have a clear impact on them. But no
full

v^hich

scale

abrofration of federal power is being

su^,vve s ted

The

.

federal frovernment will continue to reculato the
most
pervasive social forces, such as the corporation.

The'

federal courts will enforce civil ri^rhts and guarantees
to minority groups.

And federal power will be needed to

provide a proper environment for these changes.

Federal

policy must bo coordinated so that in as many related
areas as possible people will have direct responsibility

for the decisions aflecting them.

A cluster of related

functions would go to each neighborhood area.

Increased

opportunities for participation in related areas plus a
larger public sector (more money for public parks, schools,
etc.) will help to foster a more participant view of man

and life,

When the stakes involved arc not great and only

an isolated policy Iiore and there affected we cannot expect

people to develop a commitment to participation.

These reforms arc difficult to achieve, and political
will is required.

But those changes within the system, if

they arc to become more feasible and point toward a fuller

cluuir:..
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in tho nature of American life, require
activities

of a utopiaTi sort by those "outside" the
system.

It seems

to me that a full Uousseauian perspective
would point in
the s:r.uc additional directions.
The nature of this further

perspective

uccoirios

nore clear when

consider the in-

x^e

adequacies of tho reforms proposed, even could they
be
fully imi)leniented

Modern Ainerican corporations are very

larf^o and the

nature of tho work lije extremely alienatinfj.

Proposals

to make corporations more fully participant may
alleviate

some of the wor:;t features of work, hut a tr'uly nonalienatinf-: liic would require a sinaller scO.e technology.

At present there is a strong; need for f^roups "outside" the

system to demonstrate tho feasibility of a smaller scale
and decentralized teclaiolocy

.

They will show that

human bcin^js can produce enough to live in decent comiort

without becomiui^? specialized appenda^^^es of
The size and

tVGo,-graphic

tlie

macliino

dispersion of corporations means

that their fjovernments will likely become representative,

pluralist structures with most individuals still having
all to little say in some of tho most important decisions.
In addition it is one of the paradoxes of alienation that

25

Questions of the feasibility of smaller scale toclinolof^y are discussed iji C. Geor;;:e 'ieneilo and Jjimitri
iioujiHopoulis
eda., Tlio C as o for' Partici[)atory iJcmocracy
(I'Jcw York:
(Jrossman I'ublishors, lyyi)
,

.

,
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we

cnnot

e.xpeot alienated .en to
Ue able to fully en-

visage, alternatives to
exi.tln« urran«e,„ents

.

The ways

in which a ,„ore fulfilling
worlc life „,ay compensate
for
the endless spiral of
naterlal accu...ulation will
not .e

fully apparent to

tliem.

Another inadequacy of the proposed
roforns is the
sort of connnunities they would
create. These

communities

would often be lacking i„ two
respects:

thoy are not

intorgonerational and there is a
separation of work and
leisure. 2^ The individuals with
when, I

associate in

work life are often not the same
persons

noichborhood.

I

..y

know in my

Ve are fragmented and relate
to others in

fragmented ways.

And both suburbia and corporations
are

generationally segregated.

Our relationships with the

next generation and the previous one
are Infrequent a^d
superficial and thus the sort of connnunity
which can
exist is insufficient.
Such psychologists as Eric
Erickson have pointed out that a secure
sense of

personal identity derives in part from these
intergenerational relationships. 27 V/e can face the

fact of

The effects of this kind of separation are
considered
by Kenneth Keniston, The Uncommitted (New YorkDell
^
Publishing Co., i960).
.

27

Erik Erikson has dealt with the need for intergenerational community in Ch ile] hood and Society. (New York~
Norton, 1950).
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our ovn death Iocs traumatica lly when ve
hnvo close ties
to our children and tvrandchi Idren
and death and afjein.^,

to thorn is neitiier so .uystei^ious nor
f rif^hteninf; when we
do not inptitutionalis'.e thehi out uf the
picture.
It is

characteristic of the aton.isn and youth orientation
of our
society that most nei(?hborhoods excepting some
ethnic

,

coinniunitles,

are extremely secrefrated by

ar;e

.

We take

every opportunity we can to separate out "the elderly,"
and not merely in a /^eopraphic sense.

And as with the

case of alienation they (generally accept this as normal;
the vray the v/orld is.

These inadequacies all suf-gest the need for a More
radical

lon^: ranfje

perspective on community.

This per-

spective is not one that can or should easily be imposed

by covernnient.

Jiut

it sug^^ests that communal movements

"outside" the system can play a vital role by attempting
to use technolog-y to create a far more decentralized and

less alienating form of work life whore people can relate

thought to action more immediately.

Such work life should

be closely integrated to community life, as will be much

more feasible with smaller scale enterprise.

In addition

these communities should strive not merely for racial

integration but also for generational integration, something most of today's coiumunos have lacked.

A large part

of r.uch a community must also be an educational system

163

Which places far loso stress on competition
and individual
achievon^ont.
Cooperation and Uun^an h^tppiness uust
replace

achievement and personal rewards as hallmarks
of the
educational systeui,
A communal movement outside the system
is not a

"cop out" and should not be discourafyed by
political

activists.

Successful communes can

sutTftest

new economic

arran^rements and life styles to persons too fully
shaped

by our alienating work life and fragmented
conn.iunities

These men and women have been so deprived of other
satisfactions that far too much lecarninf? is derived from the

cccumulaticn of material goods.

New communal

.'\rran;?cmcr.t

may be Utopian in the sense that they cannot soon be

realized by the v/hole society, but they will constantly
challenge those within existing structures to make further
reforms.

New communities will also create new people, who

will challenge the present society by demanding reforms.

They can be a refuge for new activists and can pump new
blood into the system.
Those who participate in reformist politics and those
who form Utopian movements each need the other.

prepare the way for a new culture.

Reforms

More local neigh-

borhood freedom will mean greater chances for experiment.
Men in nonalienating work will bo fuller political par-

ticipants and make the

As'liole

concept seem more feasible

16k
to '..ealistic'. observers.

constant protest

a^^ain.st

Without Utopian co.nnmnities
and
the system too many of these

reforns can be perverted to old uses.

Participant r-^forms

can become further tools of manipulation
by corporations
and political machines. The full
f^onius of a Kousseauian

perspective on contemporary America lies
in its call for
^jradualist reforms to open new possibilities
within
the

system and the emer^rence of a nev view of
man, work,
politics and deniocracy. The development of
a new view
in these areas can open up new perspectives
and debates
in our political life, allowing: specific
reforms
to

become catalysts for Xuxthei^

citan,-^©.

165

CONCLUblON
In this thesis I have tried to show that
an often
unai-ticul.nted and unexamined conception of
human nature

underlies somo of the most influential work in
luodern
political science. IJecauso many political scientists

unaware of

are

ways in which certain basic assumptions

t]ie

underlie their methods and outlooks they are in an inadequate position to assess these.
This is especially snd at this juncture for at least
two major reasons.

Soine

important

n.'odern

philosoplicrs

have advanced arr^uments v/hich tend to undermine the basic

assumptions of

tl)e

abstract individualist conception of

human nature and the view of social science and moral

discourse
human

v\rill

Conceptions of

and purpose have {gained a new respectability

as we co^ie to

human

which it is associated.

v/ith

recoi'^^niise

the problems involved in viewing

as essentially similar to neutrons.

bcini';s

sistent problems about causality and free will

unsolved in this tradition:
scientists know

vocabulary of

Iniiuan

(i^ood

Per-

}iave

been

intuitively even social

bein/;s cannot f^ct alonf^ without a

and evil,

{;':uilt

and resentment.

Yet

what can such a vocabulary moan if we are all atoms whose
bo);avlor Is

<k;

termined and predictable.

Tlie

nature of
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re.son and e.uotion .re badly

n.i

sundorst ood

,

particularly

the way in u-hich our social and
historical dcvelopn.ent

contributes to the euer^^ence of our
needs.
cussed .omo or those pl^ilosopLical

I

have dis-

arfjurnents in the course

of this thesis, but i>any contemporary
political scientists
are unfandliar with or Tail to see
the si,,niricance of what
is occurrin,-: in the philosophical
community. There
is

Great need for serious consideration of
these issues from
the side or politicaJ science because
they have so

important a bearing on how the political
scientist works.
The political scientist i.mst begin to
consider these
issues if his whole system is not to be built on

a collap-

sin^T

foundation, and the best way in which to shore
up

that foundation is to study systematic critiques
of it and

their implications.

This thesis has focused on an intellectual tradition
and the theoretical problems in that tradition.

But

obviously the problems with that tradition are not merely
thoorntical.

To deal with some of the practical problems

briefly alludeci to at

tlie

end of my thesis

v/e

need at

least to consider raaical alternatives to our present

modes of handlin/r problems.

The days of unexamined business

as usual hopefully will not be much lon{-er tolerated.
so

And

the needs lor exaiiiin tion of a different perspective on

man and the study of

t

liis

societies is not merely

tlio

intellectual's pr.blenu

It is a problem for all or
us as

citizens.
If there are intellectual obstacles
to such a reexamin^.tion in a stuooornly held and
self -sustaininrc ideology,
there are also practical ones. My thesis
has ,viven scant

consideration t. these latter.

For there are not merely

intellectual barriers standin^^ in the way of
the
mentation of a radically different society.

in>plc-

The very

scale of our society nakes extremely difficult
the

realization of a Uousseauian v/orld.

I

have briefly

mentioned some of the practical directions in

whicli we

would have to devote attention, but hopeiully the
difficulty of the task will not prevent us from beginning
to

ask the touf^h practical questions of how to deal with
our

society here and now.

liousseau may be a Utopian, but the

Utopian vision can become an important stimulant to
eventual prof^ress.
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